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ABSTRACT 
 Although well-established indicators make it possible to predict hostile 
conventional military actions, few such indicators exist to help defense planners 
anticipate the onset of subversive activities by foreign adversaries. In the 21st century, 
however, Western societies have often been targeted by adversaries who exploit 
environmental aspects of the gray zone to subvert the democratic process and influence 
decision making. The use of non-state actors and social mobilization as well as 
non-military tactics, such as political, psychological, and information strategies, have 
frequently escalated to crises due to lack of situational awareness.  This research 
provides a brief overview of the gray-zone literature, social movement theories (SMT), 
and social network analysis/social media exploitation to show how these theories and 
methods can enhance our understanding of current crises. Based on case studies of 
Ukraine and Estonia, this research uses SMT to conceptualize, examine, and identify 
early indicators of Russian subversive actions by carefully analyzing how gray-zone 
conflicts emerge. 
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Unconventional warfare, which exploits the gray zone, is nothing new, though it 
has evolved to reflect the complexity of shifting global conditions.1 In the 21st century 
external actors have often targeted Western societies using nonmilitary tactics and 
political, psychological, and information strategies that take advantage of environmental 
aspects of the gray zone to subvert the democratic process and influence decision making 
in those societies. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the subsequent conflict between 
Russia and Ukraine are only two of the current conflicts that have evolved from a gray-
zone perspective where an external actor, through subversive actions, has tried to achieve 
its objectives. Given Russia’s continued struggle to regain its superpower status despite 
its lack of a modern military, it has been forced to leverage some kind of relative power 
over former Soviet Socialist Republics of strategic or economic interest.  Russia’s use of 
nonstate actors and social mobilization to facilitate subversion in these recent conflicts 
highlights the significance of relationships, cooperation, and human interaction, rather 
than conventional military methods, at all levels ranging from the tactical to the 
strategic.2 As illustrated by Russia’s campaign in Crimea, dominating the human domain 
before conflicts arise is crucial. Within conflicts, the mobilization of existing social 
networks has become a decisive factor, and the human domain, therefore, demands 
increased attention from any nation seeking to develop or adapt its strategy to deter an 
adversary intent on subversion. Thus, learning about social movements and resistance 
networks and their growth can help militaries enhance their situational awareness and 
force readiness in the gray zone.  
A. THE PROBLEM 
By defining the conflict environment as the gray zone, the distance between peace 
and war has drastically decreased, and the threshold for declaring war has become 
                                                 
1 Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” Joint Forces Quarterly 80, no. 1 
(2016): 108. 
2 Doowan Lee and Glenn W. Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional 
Warfare,” Small Wars Journal (2014): 1. 
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ambiguous across countries and alliances. There are well-established indicators for 
anticipating hostile conventional military actions, and for identifying which indicators 
play a crucial role in national security defense. Unfortunately, few indicators can help 
defense planners anticipate the onset of subversive activities influenced by foreign 
adversarial forces. Decision makers struggle to understand subversive warfare and lack 
good analytic indicators for recognizing subversive events in progress. Despite the 
increasing significance of gray-zone threats, analysts still fail to develop and 
systematically examine comparable warning indicators. Today, a mismatch exists 
between analyzing military movements and operations, and analyzing subversive 
operations in the gray zone. 
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE  
The purpose of this thesis is to conceptualize, develop, and examine early 
indicators and warnings for Russian subversive actions by carefully analyzing how gray-
zone conflicts emerge. Russia’s aggression in Ukraine serves as a model of Russia’s 
conduct in pre-conflict operations. Russia’s strategy in Ukraine highlights the importance 
of identifying indicators of hostile intent in the period before overt conflict occurs, not 
only to repress such conflicts, but also to thwart an adversary’s efforts to influence 
decision makers. The scope of this thesis is limited to the conflicts in Ukraine, since these 
conflicts are well documented and represent observable patterns in Russia’s current 
warfare. These findings from the Ukraine case study are then applied to Estonia to assess 
whether the indicators apply to other cases of Russian destabilization efforts.  
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 
The research question that I attempt to answer in this thesis is as follows. What 
types of information can indicate early symptoms of subversive threats in the gray zone? 
  
 3 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To answer the research question, I utilize three schools of thought, the gray-zone 
literature, social movement theories (SMT), and social networks analysis (SNA)/social 
media exploitation (SME). These are all, in one way or another, theories and methods to 
examine historical conflicts, but more important, they contribute to greater understanding 
and knowledge of current crises and conflicts. In this chapter, I first review the literature 
about gray-zone threats and the challenges these present to society and the armed forces. 
Thereafter, I examine the theories of social movements and revolution and I review how 
these theories shed light on the conceptual early indicators of subversion in the gray zone. 
Finally, I discuss the SNA and SME literature as potential methods of establishing gray-
zone indicators.  
Nations are entering a period when they must be able to meet the adversary in an 
environment “characterized by intense political, economic, informational, and military 
competition,” which some scholars define as the gray zone.3 The definition of the gray 
zone is widely discussed, and in this thesis, I will not try to develop another definition. 
Instead, I try to incorporate the gray zone’s environmental aspects that are critical for 
mitigating subversive actions. Phillip Lohaus argues that recent attempts to define the 
gray zone have lacked precision, which has hindered nations’ ability to develop 
appropriate responses.4 Of importance, then, is the context and environment that the gray 
zone implies. It is the people and its surroundings that are the focus, to influence them in 
the different areas where they participate, such as in diplomatic, societal, economic, and 
informational areas. In a United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) white 
paper, Philip Kapusta describes the gray zone as “characterized by ambiguity about the 
nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties involved, or uncertainty about the relevant 
policy and legal frameworks.”5 This highlights the interaction of people, not only 
                                                 
3 Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” 102. 
4 Phillip Lohaus, “Special Operations Forces in the Gray Zone: An Operational Framework for Using 
Special Operations Forces in the Space between War and Peace,” Special Operations Journal 2, no. 2 
(2016): 3. 
5 Philip Kapusta, The Gray Zone, white paper (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: USSOCOM, 2015). 
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military, but also the population within nations. This definition of gray zone implies that 
the gray zone demands a deeper understanding of the human domain than was required 
during the historical battles fought between two nations in an overt war. Some even go so 
far as to argue that “the human domain is one of the most critical and challenging 
aspects” of modern and future conflicts.6 The importance of mapping the human domain 
is explained by the assumption that if we have maps, we can more easily analyze where 
the areas for influence are great, but also where to analyze for further indicators. There 
are three broad categories of how to collect and analyze the human environment: 
“mapping key conditions of insurgency development, pathways of interaction, and nodes 
of influence.”7 These are crucial areas where we also should look for indicators, not only 
for our analysis on where to attack but also for how to recognize subversive actions.  
Social movement theory seeks to explain the environment within crisis through a 
human dimension focus and how social networks evolve. SMT could answer questions 
such as the following: How does a society appear when it is susceptible to influence 
operations and when it is accessible for subversive actions? What does it take to influence 
a society? Which characteristics must be present in a society for a movement to emerge? 
Is it possible for external actors to influence a society? To analyze the environment for 
indicators, one must know how the society looks when it is politically stable, or one must 
understand characteristics in a society that are crucial for influence operations, to be able 
to analyze for indicators. One should look for indicators within the areas where 
successful resistance networks have grown. 
Derek Raymond stresses the importance of analyzing a society’s human 
dynamics, and he examines the key principles of SMT and the conditions that are needed 
for a successful information operation.8 According to Doowan Lee in his article “A 
                                                 
6 Molly MacCalman, Alexander MacCalman, and Gregory Wilson, “Visualizing Social Networks to 
Inform Tactical Engagement Strategies That Will Influence the Human Domain,” From the CORE: 
Common Operational Research Environment Newsletter 4 (June 2014): 5. 
7 Christopher Fussell and D. W. Lee, “Networks at War: Organizational Innovation and Adaptation in 
the 21st Century,” in Beyond Convergence, ed. Hilary Matfess and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 
National Defense University, 2016), 380. 
8 Derek Raymond, “Combating Daesh: A Socially Unconventional Strategy” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2015), 26. 
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Social Movements Approach to UW,”9 one of the most important factors for success in 
unconventional warfare (UW) is the preexistence of a resistance movement. The 
definition of resistance movements is wide-ranging, depends on the context and can be 
either an opposition party or an underground network. This argument is reinforced by 
Christopher Fussell and Lee, who argue that smaller states and nonstate actors utilize 
networks to countervail the superiority of big nations.10 These are important arguments 
that provide the baseline in this thesis for analyzing the human domain. Nevertheless, to 
find indicators of subversion, we must understand what is normal and then analyze 
changes in the environment, or more specifically, changes that indicate that someone has 
tried to influence the environment. One way of doing that is to use SNA and SME. 
Kevin A. Horrigan and Matthew J. Piosa stress the use of SNA and SMT to better 
understand the human domain to enhance decision making and to assess the potential of 
actors to influence areas where operations will be conducted.11 Also, Glenn Johnson, 
Maurice Duclos, and Dan LeRoy argue that military planners should use SNA to “map 
out, visualize, and understand the human terrain.”12 SNA should also be fundamental 
tools for planners to aid in crafting viable strategies.  
SNA can be used as a tool to investigate the connections within movements, and 
to identify the actors or groups vital to the movements or networks. SME is used to 
explain how information and the discourse within certain areas develops, geographically 
but also within networks. Both SNA and SME interact with SMT, and an understanding 
of the specific environmental context that social networks operate in and how to use the 
                                                 
9 Doowan Lee, “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare 26, no. 3 
(2013): 30. 
10 Fussell and Lee, “Networks at War,” 369. 
11 Kevin A. Horrigan and Matthew J. Piosa, “Networks of Influence in the Central Asian States” 
(master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2016), 1. 
12 Glenn Johnson, Maurice Duclos, and Dan LeRoy, “Mapping the Human Terrain: Applying Social 
Network Analysis to an Unconventional Warfare Framework,” From the CORE: Common Operational 
Research Environment Newsletter 4 (June 2014): 8. 
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different methods to analyze them is crucial for understanding how dark networks 
operate.13 
Within a network, SNA can help identify brokers who could be crucial for 
influencing the network, and also find people who interact between different networks. 
Whether it is for disseminating information or for gathering supporters, finding 
individuals who act as brokers between social groups is a key factor in influencing 
operations.14 This is also important for decision makers in our society because it is these 
brokers who could be working for an adversary. By using SNA, it is possible to find 
people who could be engaged in Information Operations (IO), and also to observe 
changes within a network. SME supports military planners in viewing differences in the 
social media sphere such as the growth of certain topics or a certain aggressive style 
when people discuss these topics.15 SME can be skewed, however, because it is most 
applicable to youth and well-off areas where the information environment is well 
developed. 
The main criticism of SNA is that it does not gather the necessary data easily. The 
specific data includes not only race, age, and gender, but relationships between people, 
like kinship.16 Moreover, Nancy Roberts and Sean Everton state in their article, 
“Strategies for Combating Dark Networks,” SNA should not be the only approach when 
drafting one’s strategy but should work as a complement to other critical elements in the 
decision-making process. Furthermore, the SNA method and its result must be modeled 
for every different network since no single interpretation exists for each measure. Data 
depends on context and the way it is gathered, among other things. This is crucial and an 
                                                 
13 Dan Cunningham, Sean Everton, and Philip Murray, Understanding Dark Networks (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2016), 164. 
14 Raymond, “Combating Daesh,” 38. 
15 Daniel Cunningham, Sean F. Everton, and Robert Schroeder, Social Media and the ISIS Narrative 
(Monterey, CA: NPS, March 2015), 11. 
16 Dan Cunningham, “Visual Analytics” (lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, February 
13, 2017). 
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important part of the process. The data should be compared and contrasted to data from 
other networks and also within its own network to get insights.17 
It seems likely that adversaries use many of these methods as well. I argue that 
there are indicators, such as ties to foreign institutions and organizations, in the network 
environment that can reveal an adversary working subversively by conducting 
information operations trying to influence the main player within the gray zone—the 
people. These information operations can influence both the civilian population and also 
politicians and military leaders. SNA is a complement to traditional intelligence analysis 
that covers the characteristic environment specific to the gray zone. I argue that we must 
use this tool to exploit “friendly” organizations in a Phase Zero environment to find our 
adversary, to highlight a structure of previously unknown associations, and to enhance 
understanding of the human domain and its social structure as a tool in military decision 
making.  
SNA is a valuable tool for decision makers to refine their analysis so they 
recognize the enemy within this concept and stop him. The schools of thought that I have 
just discussed all contribute to a higher understanding and explanation of crises. Many 
studies state the importance of mapping the human domain to evaluate already existent 
networks to plan for UW. What is missing in these discussions, however, is the use of 
these theories and tools to understand and find the adversaries’ subversive operations in 
Phase Zero. This thesis uses the tools and theories, not only to increase understanding and 
knowledge about the environment for enhancing planning and preparation, but also to 
identify indicators in the gray zone for recognizing an adversary making subversive 
efforts, in order to apply appropriate mitigation measures and to stop an adversary before 
a crisis occurs. By doing this, we can enhance our understanding, reinforce our decisions, 
and act proactively.  
  
                                                 
17 Cunningham, Everton, and Murray, Understanding Dark Networks, 164. 
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III. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis attempts to create a model that highlights indicators and eventually can 
anticipate the onset of gray-zone crises. The research is based on three methodological 
considerations: inductive, relational, and informational. The inductive process involves 
making many observations of phenomena in the real world and finding powerful 
statements about how things work in order to create a model.18 Moreover, the importance 
of relational data and the impact of information operations will apply. Russia’s hybrid 
warfare doctrine relies heavily on leveraging and exploiting nonmilitary means and the 
use of subversive information operations. These typically flow through personal or 
organizational relations, and the use of traditional and social media outlets is common.19 
Relational data capture relations between actors such as people, organizations, and others, 
and play a greater role in this study compared to attribute data, which are nonrelational 
characteristics data.20 
Using the inductive approach, I carefully reconstruct what has happened in 
Ukraine, reflecting on theories of social movements and resistance networks to lay out 
the baseline for environmental conditions and mechanisms that are essential for 
subversive operations. Then I use an in-depth case study of Ukraine and combine prior 
cases of Russian subversion with SMT and theories of Irregular Warfare (IW) to 
illuminate theoretical indicators that will be a foundation for analysis. Using SNA and 
SME as tools together with the conceptual indicators gleaned from the theories will help 
to create a model for analyzing society and derive established indicators. 
Conceptually, this study draws from SMT and IW, together with methods like 
SNA and SME, to examine and compare relationships in a contested environment. The 
environments analyzed are Ukraine and Estonia. Ukraine functions as a role model for 
                                                 
18 Peter Sohlberg and Britt-Marie Sohlberg, Kunskapens former, Vetenskapsteori och forskningsmetod 
[The Forms of Knowledge, Theory of Science, and Research Method] (Malmoe, Sweden: Liber, 2009), 17. 
19 Mark Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadow 
(blog), July 6, 2014, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-and-
russian-non-linear-war/.  
20 Cunningham, “Visual Analytics.” 
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Russian irregular warfare and serves to show how Russia interferes with countries that 
are in their area of interest. The current conflict not only reveals information about Russia 
but also how the environment reacts to Russian influence. The research process then 
centers on SNA and SME as methods to apply to the relevant phenomena that will 
ultimately reveal indicators for subversive actions. The technology at the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Lab 
supports mapping out the human networks that are identified as significant for the 
evolution of the crisis. The challenges faced in this environment are many; therefore, it is 
important that boundaries are placed on the research. Often social media accounts are 
deleted, and social networks are always changing. This forces us to pay attention to 
where, when, and what the data we find online tells us, and to cross-check significant 
information with different sources that have both high reliability but also high validity. 
Moreover, the data I use is collected from open sources, which sometimes needs 
translation due to the use of a language other than English. This is always going to be a 
concern when working with data in another language, but by using reliable translation 
software, this should be minimized.  
Moreover, as the central focus of the study is a current event within an ever-
changing environment, the research needs to establish a frame for the environment to be 
able to evaluate the changes that occur and infer what that might indicate. This frame 
evolves by implementing this in-depth case study to create a specific narrative for the 
different stages of the crisis. The intent of the research is to provide the decision maker 
with both a method and a list of the relevant indicators of subversion that occur in the 
society. This can provide better situational awareness, but most importantly, can increase 
readiness to disrupt subversive actions.  
 11 
IV. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND SUBVERSION 
In recent years, Russia appears to have shifted to the use of various solutions 
besides overt war with armed forces to achieve its objectives. In particular, it has used 
subversive operations as part of this strategy. Subversive actions are defined as “actions 
designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or 
morale of a governing authority.”21 This is not a new or uniquely Russian concept; it is 
also a part of the Western doctrinal modus operandi described as unconventional warfare. 
For instance, the United States defines UW as “activities conducted to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 
power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a 
denied area.”22 If subversion is the goal, the UW is the means to achieve this goal, to 
diminish the national power. Because SMT describes resistance emergent among people, 
it is well suited to frame domains in the society that should be in focus. By applying 
SMT, one may derive theoretical indicators for subversive operations. 
A. OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze SMT through a UW lens to derive 
indicators for subversive operations. I first offer an introduction to SMT and describe 
how the context applies to the emergence of movements. Second, using SMT, I derive 
areas of interest regarding UW strategy and subversion. Third, from those areas, I 
conceptualize the conditions associated with the early actions of a subversive actor. 
Fourth, I analyze mechanisms and tools that exploit the conditions to achieve the 
desirable outcome (or effects). Finally, I offer a conclusion about the importance of 
understanding social movements or unarmed resistance as key early indications of crisis 
and subversion. 
                                                 
21 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, s.v. “subversion,” accessed August 6, 2017, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf.  
22 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, s.v. “unconventional warfare,” accessed August 
6, 2017, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf.   
 12 
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
Social movement theory aims to explain “collective challenges by people with 
common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with elites, opponents, and 
authorities.”23 SMT is also relevant to explaining resistance dynamics and processes.24 In 
this light, I offer that SMT can potentially enhance decision makers’ and national leaders’ 
understanding of the environment where subversion is taking place.  
This study uses SMT as a unifying framework for different scholars of emergent 
movements. I begin by briefly and critically discussing three major models within SMT, 
the classical model, the resource mobilization model, and the political process model.  
The classical model of SMT tries to explain the emergence of social movements 
as mechanisms for “alleviating psychological discomfort derived from structural 
strains.”25 This model has an individual focus where personal psychology is the main 
cause of mobilization. Nonetheless, it does not explain how individual grievances evolve 
to collective movements. In other words, this approach might be useful when explaining 
why people join a movement but not how movements continue and grow over time. 
Another perspective in SMT is the resource mobilization model that emphasizes 
the significance of the involvement of the elites to explain social movements. It posits 
that resources are crucial and contain variables that translate individual grievances into 
organized resistance. Instead of analyzing movements as irrational outbursts, it 
emphasizes the organized structured mechanisms of mobilization that provide strategic 
resources that are crucial for a movement’s sustained action.26 Proponents of this theory 
argue that many movements have not emerged from highly organized and structured 
masses and that outside support and resources have not been beneficial to the 
                                                 
23 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4. 
24 D. W. Lee, “Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory: Conditions, Mechanisms, and 
Effects,” PRISM 6, no. 3 (2016): 130. 
25 Quintan Wiktorowicz. “Islamic Activism and Social Movement Theory: A New Direction for 
Research,” Mediterranean Politics 7, no. 3 (2002): 192. 
26 Wiktorowicz, 196. 
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movement’s life cycle.27 This approach might be useful when analyzing the 
organizational factors and the linkages within but lacks the explanation of a movement’s 
outer environment.  
Another perspective used to explain and analyze the environment for conditions 
that pave the way for social movements is the political process model.28 The political 
process model argues that a social movement is a political rather than a psychological 
phenomenon. This means that a life cycle of political processes could be translated into 
social insurgency. It also highlights that a social movement should be understood as a 
longitudinal process from its emergence to its decline. The advantage of using this model 
compared to the others is that it covers the whole process of the movement rather than 
specific phases. Furthermore, the political process model highlights how ordinary people 
have the potential to mobilize to challenge the incumbent. The political process relies on 
the assumption that social movements develop in the interaction between different 
interest groups and the political changes they want to see.29 This study uses the political 
process model because it aligns with the strategy of subversion. As laid out in an article 
in a Russian military journal by General Valery Gerasimov, chief of the general staff of 
the Russian Federation, Russia’s military doctrine reflects the kind of warfare that has 
developed throughout the world. Gerasimov argues that political, economic, 
informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures, together with revolutionary 
protests, attempt to undermine the legitimacy of a target country’s political leadership.30 
Furthermore, sociologist Doug McAdam’s research about the political process and the 
development of the civil rights movement in the United States from 1930 to 1970 
illustrates how social movements challenge the incumbent and mobilize a large number 
                                                 
27 J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements,” Annual 
Review of Sociology 9, no. 1 (1983): 533, 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2946077.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ae86fc2915fc65e647e213d3d06c49bd
7.  
28 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970 (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010), 36. 
29 McAdam, 36. 
30 Galeotti, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine.’” 
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of groups by disrupting an existing political process.31 Thus, McAdam’s political process 
model highlights the type of disruptive factors that external actors may want to exploit in 
order to undermine the legitimacy of the local political process. This is reinforced by Lee 
in his article “Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory: Conditions, 
Mechanisms, and Effects,” where he describes the use of political groups, religious 
figures, and elections as conditions that can be exploited for disruptive actions.32 These 
authors all emphasize the use of an outside actor taking advantage of instability in the 
environment to influence the political legitimacy. Using the political process model 
explained by McAdam will let us highlight the indicators of subversion in a UW 
environment.  
The political process model is described by Mc Adam in four key factors: broad 
socioeconomic processes, expanding political opportunities, indigenous organizational 
strength, and cognitive liberation, as shown in Figure 1.33 
                                                 
31 McAdam, Political Process, 37. 
32 Lee, “Resistance Dynamics and Social Movement Theory,” 130. 
33 McAdam, Political Process, 51. 
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Figure 1.  The Political Process Model34 
The broad socioeconomic processes are preconditions in society that let the other 
factors emerge, such as pressure through economic and diplomatic measures.35 Those 
social processes undermine the current political structure but also create the preconditions 
for a sense of inequality or other strains within society that people want to change.36 
From these preconditions in the socioeconomic environment, the political process 
model identifies three factors that are crucial for a movement to emerge.  
Political Opportunity – This is explained as openings in the political 
environment. It could also be described as the access to the political domain and 
                                                 
34 McAdam, 51. 
35 Lee, “A Social Movement Approach,” 30. 
36 McAdam, Political Process, 41. 
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possibilities to actually participate in decision making. This happens when there is a 
change of allies and opponents, and the stability of the current ruling actors is questioned, 
which indicates a change in capacity.37 In everyday life, there is relative power in society 
where the leading authorities have the majority of power, most often due to democratic 
rules and processes or as an authoritarian decision process. These rules make it hard for 
opponents to change society in a way they want. One can interpret every change in the 
structure of the political society as a push for political opportunity. This can be an event 
that changes and undermines the stability of the leading elite or the whole system itself, a 
change in status quo. Elections are a typical event when a political opportunity may arise 
and current leaders may be questioned. Political opportunities reduce the relative power 
between the leading elite and its opponents, and the change in relative power makes it 
harder to repress an opponent.  
Indigenous Organizational Strength – To be able to mobilize, the political 
process model argues that one needs already existing organizations from which one can 
recruit and also develop opportunities in the political sphere. The political opposition 
within a country creates a network that in turn can create the seeds of opportunity. 
However, one still needs a network, community, or group in that structure to organize 
and link people together. Already existing organizations work as a recruitment base from 
which one can save time by recruiting blocs of people who are already an organized 
group. Organizations can cooperate for the same purpose or important question that they 
want to solve, even if they have other, different objectives. Moreover, the indigenous 
organizations create a network with an already existing communication network and 
experienced leaders. The indigenous organizations give the capacity to leverage 
grievance through their already existing communication network, leadership, members to 
recruit from, and incentives. It does not matter how much strain or grievance is within the 
society if no mechanism to organize people exists. McAdam argues that it is essential that 
the networks or groups are already in place and that these function as fertile ground for 
emphasizing incentives to resistance. 
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Cognitive Liberation – The earlier mentioned factors only provide structural 
mechanisms, but the cognitive liberation factor emphasizes the importance of incentives 
and a feeling of a successful resistance among people. Movements need people who are 
motivated to move from words to actions. Thus, how participants interpret their situation 
is essential. This implies that so many people must perceive political opportunities that it 
seems manageable to change their situation and that the structure or tools to change it are 
there as already existing organizations. It does not matter if isolated people perceive that 
they are unjustly treated; they must have a mass of people to be able to change their 
situation and believe in it. This mass of people makes them believe that change is doable 
and that they are not alone and have strong personal links to others. An important 
mechanism to achieve this is framing. Leaders at a strategic level can achieve a greater 
efficacy determined by how they frame their narrative. Through framing, they have a 
measure to control and to influence activists, which encourages recruitment and gains 
media attention.38 
By using SMT and the derived factors from the political process model combined 
with the objectives of unconventional warfare, one can derive four domains of interest 
where subversive operations may take place: political, economic, social, and 
informational. Analyzing these domains through the lens of the political process may 
help to achieve specific characteristics and mechanisms indicating subversive actions. 
C. DOMAINS: CHARACTERISTICS AND MECHANISMS FOR 
SUBVERSION 
Subversive operations try to disrupt the current environment within a country to 
achieve one’s strategic goals. Drawing from SMT and the characteristics of a 
movement’s emergence explained by the political process gives us four major areas 
where subversive operations most likely will appear: political, economic, social, and 
informational. By analyzing these domains, one can derive mechanisms that can indicate 
externally disruptive movements.   
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Figure 2.  The Road from Theory to Domains 
Political –The political environment in democratic nations is conducive to 
making a change or influencing internal decisions, also known as political subversion.39 
The goal for subversion is to create an unstable environment and conditions essential to 
influence decision making or to delegitimize the governing authorities.40 However, by 
influencing a democratic tool such as elections to the parliament, one can achieve a more 
legitimate outcome. These outcomes or results from the elections are harder to criticize or 
delegitimize due to the democratic process followed, even though they were influenced 
by an external actor. Other mechanisms that create political opportunities are major 
political realignments, changes in the current party structure, splinter groups, defectors, 
and existing parties that divide into several factions. This is most common in the time 
frame of elections but also sometimes when nations are in crisis. 
Economic – SMT states that economic downturns enhance movement emergence 
by leveraging human feelings—individual grievances. Economic downturns can create 
pressure on current authorities to mobilize and motivate people for a change. This area 
can either generate a mobilization but also amplify the resistance. Income inequality, 
unemployment, and other similar factors are sources of systemic strain. The use of 
economic measures creates a permissive environment and puts pressure on existing 
political authority to influence its population.41 
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41 Lee, “A Social Movement Approach.” 
 19 
Other than creating the base for grievances and economic strain, the economic 
domain can also finance resistance and develop platforms for influencing a society. In 
this domain, one can see how major investments in key industries could have an effect for 
several reasons: investment in media to enhance the information domain, ownership of 
industries that a society depends on, influencing import and export strategies, and 
offering attractive positions within the company. The energy sector also uses its power 
factor by overtly closing off the energy supply to coerce decision makers to choose 
energy suppliers as partners.42 It is also an area where resistance networks most often find 
their resources. Nonetheless, the movement needs population support to survive.  
Social – The social domain is where the emergence of a movement can grow and 
people find like-minded supporters of the movement. It is in this domain that the 
movement has its foundation for mobilizing people. This structure is essential to 
coordinating information and actions across the society.43 The emergence of new social-
political movements or minority movements to establish an organizational platform are 
ways to disturb the current political environment. Yet SMT emphasizes the use of already 
existing networks or groups where there is already an established structure with 
leadership and members. Indigenous organizations give the capacity for grievance but 
also a platform for recruiting. In the existing groups or organizations, there is already a 
common purpose or goal they share that can either reinforce or connect groups to each 
other.  
Informational – In this domain, strategic communication can be used to build a 
counter-narrative to the current political one. One way to do this is to create a narrative 
that describes a specific minority group of people as victimized and exposed to unjust 
treatment by the current leadership. Creating a narrative about how some people are 
mistreated or how bad the West is, or disseminating information that is pro-Russian, 
among others, are tools to increase grievances and establish a sense of aggression. This 
area generates diagnostics, prognostications, and motivations to enhance the conditions 
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for subversion. Broadly, one finds the use of media to create a narrative and shape the 
information environment in the society to prepare for a decision in which Russia has an 
interest.44 The informational part can gain popular support, and by that, can legitimize 
Russian actions.  
D. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 
In this chapter, I have emphasized the importance of understanding social 
movements and unarmed resistance as key early indications of crisis and subversion. By 
merging SMTs and the objectives of subversive operations, one can derive domains of 
interest: political, economic, social, and ideological. Within those domains, one can 
identify general mechanisms and characteristics that externally disruptive movements 
might use to gain power within society. Events such as major political realignments, 
oppositional parties and splinter groups, or an existing party’s split into several factions 
are examples of how political opportunities arise. Economic factors, such as investments 
in key industries, but more specifically energy and media agencies, are other mechanisms 
used to influence decisions. Moreover, economic downturns put pressure on current 
authorities but also help create incentives for those who want to challenge the ruling 
government. In the social domain, new movements will emerge and evolve. Though it 
focuses on already existing organizations to recruit people, at the same time, the social 
domain may reveal creation of political opportunity. Finally, the ideological approach 
tries to gather individual grievances to collective actions through presenting incentives or 
creating psychological strain. The use of media like the internet and television to 
disseminate messages and to build a narrative is essential. In the next chapter, these 
factors are applied to the Ukraine crisis to analyze events in order to derive indicators of 
potential subversive operations.  
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V. CASE STUDY OF UKRAINE 
Russia’s use of subversion to reach its strategic objectives is well documented in 
the literature.45 Nevertheless, although Russia’s objectives are obvious and the analyses 
of the military operations that have disrupted Ukrainian sovereignty are many, few have 
studied early indicators of the crisis. Russia’s annexation of Crimea, which surprised 
many nations,46 highlights the importance of identifying indicators of hostile intent in 
order to repress such operations, but also to restrain Russia’s intention to influence 
decision makers, also known as subversive actions.47 Leveraging subversive operations 
using the human domain has become a key factor. Valery Gerasimov, the chief of the 
Russian General Staff, stated that the Arab Spring presents an example of war in the 21st 
century and that the use of political, economic, informational, social, and other 
nonmilitary means has increased the utility of the human domain and the potential of 
social movements.48 Gerasimov’s statements imply that resistance mobilization is a tool 
for subversion that Russia uses to achieve its objectives. This is reinforced by the Russian 
Federation military doctrine, which states that one of the main internal military risks for 
Russia is subversive information activities targeting the population. The doctrine also 
highlights the characteristics of current military conflicts as “integrated employment of 
military force and political, economic, informational or other nonmilitary measures 
implemented with a wide use of the protest potential of the population and of special 
operations forces.”49 The Russians have clearly identified methods and mechanisms 
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successfully leveraged in current crises and conflicts. They also have stated that one of 
their main tasks for deterring and preventing military conflicts is to respond in similar 
manner and to “neutralize potential military risks and military threats through political, 
diplomatic, and other nonmilitary means.”50 Russia’s intervention in Ukraine is no 
exception. 
A. OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER  
In this chapter, I analyze events in Ukraine prior to the annexation of Crimea to 
highlight Russia’s actions aimed at influencing the society. First, I highlight earlier 
research done in that area and then briefly summarize the historical context to enhance 
understanding of the political and social environment in Ukraine. Second, I 
chronologically analyze SMT theoretical indicators in the political, economic, social, and 
ideological domains as described in Chapter II. Dividing the events according to those 
domains makes the different characteristics and mechanisms important for subversive 
indicators more apparent. Beginning with the political domain and a brief historical 
backdrop to the political environment contributes to a better understanding of how this 
framework can be utilized to influence decision making. More specifically, I study how 
the other domains—economic, social, and informational—seize the opportunity presented 
by political instability. Finally, I provide a conclusion about findings in the different 
domains of established subversive indicators, which might support analysts and decision 
makers in a contested environment.   
B. PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND HISTORICAL BACKDROP 
After gaining its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Ukraine has 
struggled through several crises such as the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan related 
to its huge neighbor in the east, Russia. Yet, modern research and analyses of the Ukraine 
crisis, more specifically the annexation of Crimea, have mostly focused on the “little 
green men” that occupied government buildings and Russia’s use of its military forces in 
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the eastern parts of Ukraine in 2014. Table 1 summarizes some of the research in well-
cited journals and from recognized publishers about the Ukraine crisis. These articles 
mostly cover the period of late 2013 and onward. They highlight the military aspect of 
the Ukrainian crisis but lack the analyses of how its political, economic, and social 
aspects influenced the society and decision makers through subversion prior to the 
annexation. In this chapter, I analyze events prior the annexation in early 2014 to reveal 
indicators of Russian subversion.  
Table 1.   Previous Research.51 
Title Publication/Publisher What When? 
Samuel Charap, 2015, “The 
Ghost of Hybrid War” 









Oscar Jonsson and Robert 
Seely, 2015, Russian Full-
Spectrum Conflict: An 
Appraisal After Ukraine 
 




Spring 2014 and forward 
 
 
Niklas Granholm, Johannes 
Malminen and Gudrun 
Persson (eds), 2014, A Rude 
Awakening: Ramifications of 
Russian Aggression Towards 
Ukraine 
 





Late 2013 until May 2014 
 
 
Amos C Fox, 2017, The 
Russian–Ukrainian War: 
Understanding the Dust 
Clouds on the Battlefield – 
 




July 2014 and forward 
 
 
Michael McFaul, Stephen 
Sestanovich, and John 
Mearsheimer, 2014, Faulty 
Powers Who Started the 




Focus on why, not how 
Russia acted. 
 
2000 to 2014 
 
 
Janis Berzins, 2014, Russia’s 
New Generation Warfare in 
Ukraine: Implications for 
Latvian Defense Policy. 
 
National Defence Academy of 




January 2014 and forward 
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Title Publication/Publisher What When? 
 
Bret Perry, 2015, “Non-Linear 
Warfare in Ukraine: The 
Critical Role of Information 
Operations and Special 
Operations” 
 
Small Wars Journal 
Focus on information 
operations 
 
Overview (no specific events 
or times) pre-2014. More in 




Michael Kofman, Katya 
Migacheva, Brian Nichiporuk, 
Andrew Radin, Olesya 
Tkacheva, and Jenny 
Oberholtzer, 2017, Lessons 
from Russia’s Operations in 
Crimea and Eastern Ukraine 
 
RAND 
Analysis of political 
mobilization and combat 
operations in Eastern 
Ukraine 
February to May 2014 
 
 
Tadeus Osazanski, 2014, 
Unity Stronger than Divisions 
 
Point of View - Centre for 
Eastern Studies 
Historical backdrop but no 
analysis about specific  
indicators of subversion 
Post-2014 
 
Heather A. Conley, James 
Mina, Ruslan Stefanov, 
Martin Vladimirov, 2016, The 
Kremlin Playbook – 
Understanding Russian 
Influence in Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
 
CSIS - Center for Strategic and 
International Studies 
A good analysis but misses 
the social part of emergent 
movements. Has a more 




Christopher S Chivvis, 2017, 
Understanding Russian 
“Hybrid Warfare”: And What 
Can Be Done about It. 
 
RAND 
States what Russia does, but 




C. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
Russia regards Ukraine as a country in which it has enduring interests. Ukraine’s 
biggest minority is Russian, and Ukraine’s geographical position makes it strategically 
important, especially as a buffer zone between Russia and the West. This is partly why 
Russians see the expansion of the West as a threat to their interests and consider every 
increasing linkage from Ukraine to the European Union as a decrease in Russian 
influence.52 
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Ukraine is highly dependent on Russian energy, which is why Russia has used it 
as an influence tool.53 As an example, 83 percent of Ukraine’s aluminum industry is 
owned by Russian investors, and in 2013, Russia was the number one importer and 
exporter of Ukrainian energy; second was the European Union (EU).54 Due to Ukraine’s 
old-fashioned industry, which consumes considerable amounts of energy, and because 
Ukraine lacks its own resources, it is very dependent on Russia and its resources. This 
has been used both as a carrot and a stick to influence decision making in favor of 
Russia.55 
Furthermore, while the EU tries to promote democracy and deepen economic and 
political cooperation, Russia tries to counter the overtures using traditional and 
nontraditional tools of state power to pressure and influence Ukraine. The use of business 
affiliates and the energy sector, and its policy of supporting and protecting the rights of 
Russians living abroad, alias its compatriot policy, are only some of the ways it seeks to 
influence Ukraine through means other than the use of military force.56 Historically, 
Russia has had a low level of institutional ties with Ukraine and instead used its 
connections to pro-Russian elites, but this has changed.57 Moreover, Russia also tries to 
gain influence through its compatriot policy, which focuses on ethnic Russians and 
Russian speakers. This was reinforced in President Putin’s speech to the Duma at the 
same time as the annexation of Crimea:  
Millions of Russians and Russian-speaking people live in Ukraine and will 
continue to do so. Russia will always defend their interests using political, 
diplomatic and legal means. But it should be above all in Ukraine’s own 
interest to ensure that these people’s rights and interests are fully 
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protected. This is the guarantee of Ukraine’s state stability and territorial 
integrity.58 
Ukraine plays a significant role in Russia’s foreign policy. Its interests in Ukraine 
rest on many factors, some of which are shared by the EU and the West. Geographically, 
Ukraine is the largest country on the European continent with a population of about 44 
million people. It has a strategic location in many aspects. Not only is the Russian Black 
Sea fleet stationed in Crimea, but also the gas pipeline from the Russian gas company 
Gazprom to Europe passes through Ukraine. Ukraine has a long history with Russia, and 
some people see Ukraine as the heart of Orthodox Church history. About 17 percent of 
Ukraine’s population is Russian-speaking, most of them in Eastern Ukraine, and the 
Russian media outlets are widespread, giving the Russian government a tool to leverage 
its own narrative.59 
What is just discussed and outlined in this section partly explains Russia’s 
interests but also concludes Russia’s prerequisites for influencing. What follows is a 
theoretical analysis of Ukrainian society through the different domains derived from 
SMT where Russian events are the focus. 
D. THE POLITICAL DOMAIN 
Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, and the political system and the ruling 
government were relatively young. The political parties evolved from different subgroups 
with dissident interests via political parties with strong ties to business affiliates, to 
developed and stable parties after the Orange Revolution and Euromaidan. Despite many 
changes through the years in alliances and party configurations, however, the established 
politicians have remained the same.60 
From 1994 to 2005, then-President Kuchma drove Ukraine closer to the EU while 
little protest from Russia was heard. However, corruption, constraint of media, and 
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limitations in the political sphere hindered the discussions between leaders in the EU and 
their Ukrainian counterparts.61 
The pro-democracy protest in 2004, the Orange Revolution, turned the EU and its 
leaders towards Ukraine and the interest in cooperation evolved. The Orange Revolution 
and other pro-Western influences, however, did not fulfill the pledges to the Ukrainian 
people. The people had not seen any major changes and were tired of the corrupt political 
system.62 In Russia, the Orange Revolution was seen as an operation conducted by the 
West to undermine Russia’s influence in Ukraine.  
The Orange Revolution created an environment of instability and struggle 
between its backers and the opposition. After the revolution, the political landscape was 
divided into mainly two blocs: (1) the pro-Western bloc led by Viktor Yushchenko and 
his party, Our Ukraine, along with Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko and the Bloc of 
Yulia Tymoshenko, and (2) the pro-Russian bloc led by Viktor Yanukovych and his Party 
of Regions.63 Due to the conflict between the coalition within the Orange Revolution and 
Viktor Yanukovych and his Party of Regions, the pro-Western inspiration that got a push 
from the revolution began to decline. Despite the Western-friendly revolution, the EU did 
not show any greater interest in drawing Ukraine further into the EU, and at the same 
time it was careful not to push its agenda too hard, in order to avoid conflict with Russia. 
Before 2005, the EU did not engage in any domestic change in the Ukraine political 
landscape.64 The Ukraine-European Union Action Plan was the first step to connecting 
these two parts. The Action Plan was a plan to integrate Ukraine more to the EU and 
fulfil the demands of a member state. However, there were no clear incentives for 
Ukraine to actually fulfill these obligations, and Ukrainian citizens did not see any greater 
changes in the society.  
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This was reflected in the 2006 parliamentary election in which no one won a 
majority, creating a situation where decisions hardly could get through and a prime 
minister could not be chosen.65 This created a political vacuum where everyone tried to 
leverage their agenda to attract other parties to form a coalition. After a couple of months, 
a coalition emerged between Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, the Socialist Party of 
Ukraine, and the Communist Party, which nominated Yanukovych as a prime minister.  
Unfortunately, this setting was doomed to fail due to struggles between President 
Yushchenko and the coalition. Trying to find a solution to this struggle, a document 
signed by the leaders of the three biggest parties in the last election, Party of Regions, the 
Socialist Party of Ukraine, and the People’s Union Our Ukraine, contained guidelines for 
decision making where the president and the coalition had disagreements, such as the 
Russian language and membership in NATO.66 The document stated that Ukraine should 
enhance its ties to Europe, such as to NATO, the WTO (World Trade Organization), and 
the EU.67 This agreement gave hope and influenced most of Ukraine’s people whose lives 
had not improved after the election, despite overwhelming election promises.68 The 
NATO discussions were still ongoing, though some people, mostly in the eastern part of 
Ukraine, thought that membership would constrain them from meeting their relatives, 
many of whom still lived in Russia. This situation was later utilized by the Russian 
government through its compatriot policy. Nevertheless, Yanukovych did not follow the 
agreement and began to violate its terms. He became anti-EU and stated that Europe and 
NATO should not be an option.69 In early 2007, the instability and the corroded 
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relationship between the president and the parliament majority became too much. The 
president Viktor Yushenko, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, and the chairman of the 
parliament, Oleksandr Moroz, decided to dissolve the parliament. This forced them to 
conduct a new parliamentary election in September 2007.  
Further events highlighted the competition for influence in Ukraine between the 
EU and Russia. In 2007, the EU began to negotiate with Ukraine about an association 
agreement (AA).70 The AA aimed to help Ukraine associate politically and integrate 
economically with the EU.71 Between 2008 and 2011, the EU discussed both the AA and 
a trade agreement, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) 
between the EU and Ukraine. These agreements were a clear increase in the battle for 
influence and were intended to persuade Ukraine to distance itself from Russia. Russia’s 
answer to this was to try to get Ukraine to join the Belarus-Russia-Kazakhstan Customs 
Union (BRK-CU). DCFTA and BRK-CU were not compatible with each other, which 
laid out a clear competition between the EU and Russia for Ukraine.72 This situation was 
a clear incentive for both the EU and Russia to take advantage of the relatively unstable 
situation in Ukraine, an outcome to the emerged from the blurred leadership within 
Ukraine government. 
The international financial crisis of 2007–2009 had a significant impact on the 
2010 presidential election. Viktor Yanukovych’s focus on business-friendly policies, 
stability measures, and pro-Russian orientation aligned with what the Ukrainian 
population supported at that time. The common economic interests, family connections 
between countries, and a shared history were three main reasons important for the 
population’s decision in the election.73 These were things that Russia leveraged and 
emphasized when it operationalized its influence operations. 
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The 2010 presidential election gave Viktor Yanukovych the power.74 The people 
thought that the Orange Revolution leaders had failed to deliver on their promises and 
therefore turned against them.75 Tymoshenko, however, did not recognize Yanukovych as 
president, alleging fraud, and stepped down as prime minister due to lack of support.76 
Many from her coalition were persuaded to join a new coalition that consisted of the 
Party of Regions, Communists, and many defectors from Tymoshenko’s coalition.77 
Yanukovych then appointed Mykola Azarov as a new prime minister. Azarov had 
been Yanukovych’s right-hand man for several years and was a loyal member of the pro-
Russian Party of Regions.78 The focus changed slowly towards Russia, and Ukraine’s 
progress towards integration with the EU halted. Yanukovych started to adapt pro-
Russian policies and moved away from NATO interests.79 Yanukovych renewed Russia’s 
lease of the Black Sea naval base in Sevastopol for 25 years and created laws that 
determined Ukraine’s nonaligned status.80 This agreement was not unanimously 
embraced. The outcome, though, was the cheaper gas price for Ukraine.81 Furthermore, in 
October 2010, Yanukovych and the constitutional court erased the limits on presidential 
power, such as naming government ministers, which was a part of a deal that ended the 
Orange Revolution protests in 2004.82 This restored the regulations of 1996.83 
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Because of Yanukovych’s presidential position, he was now able to use legal 
sanctions on political opponents. He began to target people that have been active during 
the Orange Revolution and charged them for different criminal acts.84 Two of those were 
Yulia Tymoshenko, a former prime minister, and Yuriy Lutsenko, a former minister of 
internal affairs with close ties to Tymoshenko, who were charged with abuse of state 
funds.85 Tymoshenko has been an active voice for Western focus and the work against 
corruption and was Yanukovych’s main opponent in the presidential election in 2010. 
Both Tymoshenko and Lutsenko were later sent to jail. This drew great criticism from 
both the opposition in Ukraine and international observers. 
In 2011, Yanukovych took some small steps to counter his critics and hoped by 
those actions to strengthen relations with the EU and placate the oppositional factions. In 
March, ex-president Leonid Kuchma, former president of Ukraine, was charged with 
involvement in journalist Georgiy Gongadze’s death. Gongadze was a critical reporter of 
Kuchma’s presidency and was murdered in 2000. Kuchma was suspected pretty early, but 
he could never be charged at that time. In April, the main suspects in Gongadze’s killing, 
Olexiy Pukach and two other police officers, are said to have confessed and were sent to 
jail.86 
Further on, the parliamentary election was held in October 2012 and had a 
debatable outcome. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
observers, the United States, and the EU were skeptical. A report released in January 
2013 by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), noted 
that the concerns were primarily due to “the abuse of administrative resources, lack of 
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transparency of campaign and party financing, and the lack of balanced media 
coverage.”87 
Moreover, a proposal for a new language law fueled a debate among the political 
parties in the 2012 election. The Party of Regions, the Communist Party, and the Russian 
Bloc had a main objective of establishing the Russian language as the second state 
language in Ukraine. The party United Opposition-Batkivschyna, UDAR, Svoboda, and 
Our Ukraine did not agree to this.88 
In 2013, President Yanukovych steered Ukraine closer to the EU and established 
relationships to sign the AA. Just before signing in November 2013, the government 
abandoned further discussions with the EU and instead signed another agreement with 
Russia.89 The Russian agreement concerned the Custom Union with Russia, lower gas 
prices, and a decrease in a loan that Ukraine had. The abandonment of the AA in 
November 2013 shifted the focus toward Russia and ignited massive civil unrest (known 
as Euromaidan because the protests began in Maidan Square in Kiev), which resulted in 
the death of several protesters and excessive violence from the police to constrain the 
protest. In February 2014, President Yanukovych fled to Russia and abandoned the 
country. This was the beginning of the end of several-months-long unrest against 
corruption and people tired of abandoned promises.  
The Ukrainian political environment in its historical context is almost a road map 
for what SMT explains as political opportunities. The election system has changed 
throughout time, and different rules and regulations regarding political parties and 
coalitions have been introduced. The institutional environment has changed depending on 
who the president is, and the power has shifted between the president and the parliament. 
The political environment has had increasing problems with financial industrial groups, 
personalization of political parties, defectors between parties, lack of coherence, and 
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differences in geographical support due mainly to language attributes. Due to weak 
ideology, and sometimes to corruption, the loyalty of leading politicians is quite often 
questioned. As an example, Petro Poroshenko and five others founded the Party of 
Regions then moved to a series of other parties, including Our Ukraine, Front for Change, 
and finally UDAR. Poroshenko has floated between being allied to both pro-Russian and 
pro-Western parties.90 The Party of Regions has its roots in the Donbass region most 
known for its many Russian-speaking oligarchs and having an attraction to old Soviet 
nostalgia.91 
E. THE ECONOMIC DOMAIN 
Despite gaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine’s economic ties to Russia are 
significant. Due to income inequalities, unemployment, and other considerations, 
Russia’s use of economic mechanisms as tools for influence has been obvious. Gazprom 
is Russia’s largest gas company and provides many parts of Europe with gas; its main gas 
pipeline to Europe goes through Ukraine. In 2006, Russia demonstrated its use of 
Gazprom as a power tool to influence decision makers in Ukraine.92 Russia argued that 
Ukraine kept some gas for its own consumption and that the price Ukraine paid was too 
low.93 By turning off the natural gas that it provided to Ukraine and other parts of Europe, 
Russia highlighted the necessity of good relationships with Russia. In 2005, the gas price 
went from $50 to $230 per 1,000 cubic meters. This seems to be an outcome of the 
Orange Revolution and enforced a new agreement that was set in January 2005 for 
another five-year period. 
In April 2008, Gazprom sbyt Ukraine, a subsidiary to Gazprom, was registered in 
Ukraine. They signed a contract with Ukraine’s biggest energy company, Naftogaz 
Ukraine, to supply them with gas directly instead of going through a privately owned 
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company, RosUkrEnergo.94 This increased Russian influence in Ukraine’s general 
economic sphere but also demonstrated a more direct influence over the Ukrainian 
government. In January 2009, however, another dispute between Ukraine and Gazprom 
occurred over unpaid bills, which allowed the Russians to cut off the gas for many areas, 
mostly in Ukraine. Russia had kept raising the gas prices over several years when it 
peaked in 2009 at $230 per 1,000 cubic meters.95 The increase of the gas price and the 
level it reached was not what was disturbing because the price Ukraine had paid was still 
lower than the world price. More disturbing was how Russia introduced the price increase 
and the disruption of gas production in the middle of the winter that signaled some kind 
of will to influence Ukraine decision making. In one week, however, the gas was turned 
on again since a new 10-year agreement was signed between Russia and Ukraine.96 
Furthermore, in the summer of 2013, the AA with the EU was published, and 
Russia now had the opportunity to read it. The agreement clearly stated that Ukraine 
would no longer be able to maintain the same relationships with Russia as it had earlier.97 
Therefore, Russia became more engaged in the discussions about the AA and undertook a 
coercive stance to deter the Ukrainian government from continuing to pursue these pro-
Western actions. The Russian policy targeted President Yanukovych and his political 
decisions by exercising influence in the economic sector, more specifically in import and 
export between the two countries. Dr. Lilia Shetsova, the senior associate at the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace in Moscow, said that this was the beginning of a 
trade war that Russia had started to influence, or more precisely to force, Yanukovych to 
end the dialog with the EU.98 The Ukrainian ambassador in the United Kingdom, Andrii 
Kuzmenko, also highlights that there were lots of influence actions from Russia due to 
the AA. These political and economic actions from Russia, which Kuzmenko termed as a 
customs war, milk war, gas war, and other similar phrases, had the sole purpose of 
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preventing Ukraine’s integration with the EU.99 Russia’s restrictive trade measures were 
a big loss for the companies and industry and were aimed at forcing Ukraine to cancel its 
dialogue with the EU and instead join the Moscow-led Customs Union.100 
All these measures taken by Russia in the economic domain created an unstable 
environment where grievances and polarization among the citizens increased. This, in 
turn, was leveraged against the ruling government in order to influence decisions in 
Russia’s favor. Most often, the economic domain boosts the social conditions through 
organizations and corporations linked to Russia, which were developed to disseminate the 
Russian narrative. In summary, the economic domain reinforces Russia’s influence 
potential among the population partly through its media outlets but also through its 
compatriot policy.  
F. THE SOCIAL DOMAIN 
Utilizing the Russian population as a “power tool” is nothing new and is very 
tangible in areas where Russia has interests; this is also known as the compatriot 
policy.101 It is a tool used by Russia to legitimize its involvement in other countries’ 
businesses and to build incentives for becoming involved in those countries’ political 
process. The concept of the compatriot policy is to influence both Russians abroad but 
also people within Russia to gain support for Russia’s activities. The policy also works as 
a threat to foreign governments that Russia will interfere if they do not take care of the 
Russian people.102 
A cornerstone of the compatriot policy is the Russkiy Mir (Russian World). In 
2007, the creation of the Russkiy Mir Foundation was decreed by the Russian president. 
Russkiy Mir is linked to the Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation—
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Rossotrudnichestvo—and is supposed to emphasize Russian culture and the Russian 
language abroad, which is the Russian compatriot policy.103 In October 2013, Russkiy 
Mir announced that they would open three new Russian centers in Ukraine.104 These 
centers create a platform for disseminating pro-Russian information and give the Russian 
government a legal, geographical base to engage domestically. Today, Ukraine has 11 
Russian centers, compared to the United States, which has two, where Russkiy Mir 
disseminates its messages.105 Since 2009, the Rossotrudnichestvo and the Russkiy Mir 
have coordinated their activities and aggregated their objectives. This has both 
strengthened Russkiy Mir and also given the Russian government the opportunity to work 
through its network and physical locations.106 These organizations build the narrative 
primarily about Russian culture but more specifically the Russian language. 
In July 2012, a law was passed that strengthened the Russian language in Ukraine. 
The law stated that Russian should get a regional language status, and many feared that 
this would divide the country even more.107 Protests arose against the language law but 
without any success. Yanukovych and his allies argued that this was a way to get closer 
to the EU and to follow the rules of human rights in Ukraine. Due to the relatively large 
protests, this law has been used many times to depict Ukrainians as Nazis because they 
do not accept Russian as a second language. Therefore, Russian media outlets will be 
able to smear the current leadership.   
In May 2012, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev signed an executive order to 
establish a foundation for the support of the Russian compatriots and to defend the rights 
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of Russians in courts abroad.108 Between 2012 and 2013, it received about $8 million 
from the Russian government. The foundation is responsible for Human Rights centers, 
and in 2013, there were about 10,000 beneficiaries, three times more than the previous 
year.109 These beneficiaries are not official and can be anyone promoting or supporting 
Russian interests, such as politicians or other influential persons. 
Victor Medvedchuk is a former Ukrainian politician with considerable influence 
in current Ukrainian political decision making. His work in the Kuchma administration 
from 2002 to 2005 and his many interests in the business sector make him a person with 
many engagements but also many opportunities to influence people in his areas of 
interest. Moreover, Medvedchuk has strong connections to the Russian government in 
general, but more specifically to Putin himself. In 2012, Medvedchuk established the 
Ukrainian Choice, a nongovernmental organization (NGO), as a reaction to Ukraine’s 
pro-Western approach. Its goal was to prevent then president Yanukovych from signing 
agreements with the EU.110 In 2013, Medvedchuk invited President Putin to a conference 
where Putin emphasized the importance of good relationships between the two 
countries.111 Medvedchuk also launched a forum that discussed the dangers of becoming 
a member of the EU.112 Ukrainian Choice aims to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty from 
foreign interference and to develop democratic values within decision making. 
Furthermore, it emphasizes the importance of self-determination in decisions like what 
language to use, the government’s not interfering in personal decisions, self-government, 
and free choice of territory.113 The partners to the Ukrainian Choice are most often 
organizations working to increase cooperation between Russia-Ukraine and are often 
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related to war veterans, education, businesses, and religious affiliates.114 Ukrainian 
Choice strongly opposed the EU agreement DCFTA (Deep and Comprehensive Free 
Trade Area) and broadcasted what the damage would be if Ukraine signed it. In 2013, 
Medvedchuk also established the Eurasian Forum in Kiev, partnering with the Russian 
Youth Public Council, which emphasized the same message.115 
Another NGO is the Russian Orthodox Church, which is working to reunite the 
Russian world. The church has a Russian-centric approach, working through affiliated 
NGOs, various publications, and charity groups, to spread its political issues—mainly 
criticisms of the EU and NATO membership. The church cooperates with other religious 
groups abroad that are affiliated in certain ways to the Moscow Patriarchate. In 2013, the 
Russian Orthodox Church’s own international organization, Day of Baptism of Rus (Den 
Kreshchenia Rus), which was created in 2007, launched open-air concerts in ten cities 
across Ukraine. These events aimed to strengthen the church’s objective to unite Ukraine, 
Belarus, and Russia, by using slogans like “We are one” and “Unity for Slavic 
People.”116 
Another tool of the Russian government in the effort to create its narrative is the 
use of paramilitary groups such as the Night Wolves and the Russian Cossack network. 
They both have significant funding and have been very active since 2013. The Night 
Wolves have close cooperation with Putin, who is a member of the gang, and in 2011 and 
2012, they held their annual meetings in Crimea. In 2013, Putin was present at their 
annual meeting. Another organization, the Russian Cossack Network, had a summer 
camp in Crimea in 2013 that taught young people typical military skills, such as shooting 
and fighting. Both these organizations had huge funding and close ties to the Russian 
government.117 
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G. THE INFORMATIONAL DOMAIN 
Strategic communication used to build a counter-narrative can be used, in turn, to 
victimize minority groups or to describe them as exposed to an unfair situation in the 
country where they live. A narrative describing how a Russian minority is mistreated, 
dissemination of information that is pro-Russia, and emphasizing how bad the West is, 
among other things, is meant to increase grievances and incite people to protest against 
the ruling elite. 
The ideological factors are mainly disseminated and reinforced by the Russian 
World concept—Russkiy Mir, cultural centers, media projects, and other pro-Russian 
organizations. These are organizations, most often funded by the Russian government, 
which makes it difficult for Ukrainian media companies to get the same impact with less 
support. As an example, in July 2010, a Kiev court decided to cancel the allocation of 
frequencies for two privately owned TV channels, which, according to Ukrainian media 
experts, were two channels that provided independent news.118 This also happened in the 
same period as Ukrainian Security Service head Valery Khoroshkovsky applied for new 
frequencies to his rival media company, Inter Media Group.119 Valery Khoroshkovsky is 
well known for his close ties and his co-ownership of media companies with pro-Russian 
people.120 
Furthermore, in February 2013, the Russian government released a policy 
document emphasizing the importance of building a positive narrative of Russia 
abroad.121 The document strengthened Russia’s compatriot policy but also highlighted the 
use of media and other information channels as a tool to disseminate its pro-Russian 
narrative. Russia uses members of political parties or other people who are in positions of 
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power as “experts” who strengthen Russia’s narrative while messaging in media and 
other information outlets.122 
Once again, in February 2014, just after the collapse of the Yanukovych 
government, the Russian media broadcasts targeted the Maidan movement as a fascist 
movement, which discredited the new government; and emphasized the hostile 
environment to Russian people and the upside to Crimea’s return to Russia,123 which was 
a familiar narrative. 
H. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE 
Influencing people means influencing those who make decisions. This chapter 
analyzed how this is applied by Russia when trying to achieve its interests abroad. The 
use of SMT complements the currently available analysis of Russia’s actions by having a 
population-centric approach. The four areas derived from the political process model 
through UW explain crucial areas where one also should look for indicators of subversive 
actions. SMT can be used to analyze episodes of contentious collective actions and 
therefore is a usable tool to study changes in society and actions taken for influencing 
people.124 The analysis of Ukraine has revealed the following main indicators for 
Russia’s subversive actions in the different domains: 
 Development of Culture Centers, NGOs, and other gathering points where 
they can spread their propaganda. 
 Indirect support of political realignments, parties, and splinter groups. 
 Use of lies to smear the Ukrainian government—media propaganda. 
 Use of surrogates to finance political dissidents. 
 Shutting down airwaves and marginalizing media. 
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 Cutting off the gas. 
The categories of how to collect and analyze the human environment were 
mentioned earlier. By “mapping key conditions of insurgency development, pathways of 
interaction, and nodes of influence,”125 one can build a good roadmap when crafting 
strategies to counter subversion. Furthermore, working through NGOs and in the fog of 
compatriots and using economic influence, mainly through the energy sector (Gazprom), 
are Russia’s way of subverting Ukraine’s political environment and Ukrainian society as 
a whole.  
This case study focused on the four domains and the indicators derived through 
SMT. In the political environment, where many people may have access, one can see that 
Ukraine has had a lot of political instability and struggle in the society, which emphasizes 
political opportunities. It is a relatively unstable political environment where existing 
parties have divided into several factions or splinter groups. The emergence of culture 
centers and other NGOs is Russia’s way of maintaining influence without picking up 
arms.  
The complexity of this crisis, but also crises in general, highlights the importance 
of cooperation between agencies and NGOs to better resist attempts at subversion but 
also to detect it earlier.  
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VI. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF UKRAINE 
This chapter’s purpose is to analyze Ukraine prior to the annexation of Crimea 
and examine how different networks evolved. Specifically, how has the network of 
interactions between Russia and Ukraine changed, and how has the relation between sub-
state actors evolved? Moreover, using SNA to highlight changes in the Ukraine crisis 
may be useful for anticipating and highlighting subversive actions and may contribute to 
the understanding of specific indicators in the different domains. Finally, this case study 
will analyze how Russia might use its state power tools working beside and through 
NGOs. 
A. OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER  
The chapter’s outline is as follows. First, it details and describes the network 
data—its sources, its boundaries, and the relationships and attributes coded—and presents 
sociograms (i.e., network maps) of the networks. Next, an exploratory analysis of the 
network looks at the interactions between Russia and Ukraine and their sub-state actors, 
beginning in January 2012 and ending January 2016. Finally, it investigates whether there 
were any significant changes in the network during the Ukraine crisis and how the 
network evolved, if at all. 
B. DATA DESCRIPTION AND NETWORK BOUNDARIES  
After careful consideration of the pros and cons of each method to boundary 
identification, I settled upon a nominalist (objective) strategy coupled with a positive and 
negative communications event definitional focus.126 Nevertheless, knowing that the goal 
was to specify the boundaries of the network accurately, I decided I would most likely 
succeed using a hybrid approach.127 The data is derived monthly from the Integrated 
Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) dataset.128 The data contains events coded as 
                                                 
126 Sean Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012, 77. 
127 Everton, 79. 
128 Elizabeth Boschee et al., “ICEWS Coded Event Data,” Version 22, Harvard Dataverse, 2015, 
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/28075.  
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either cooperative or hostile interactions between sociopolitical actors such as 
individuals, groups, or nation states. The events are extracted and identified from 
different news articles by the BBN ACCENT coder, which identifies approximately 300 
types of sociopolitical events in plain text such as news articles, Twitter feeds, or similar 
sources.129 These events are essentially quadruples, consisting of a source actor, event 
type (according to the CAMEO taxonomy of events), target actor, and date.130 
 The nodes in this study are sub-state actors (sectors of society) in Ukraine 
and Russia: government, business, civilian, education, judiciary, media, 
opposition, private organizations, and rebel groups. In the tables and 
figures the nodes have six-letter acronyms where the first three letters 
point to which country they represent, Russia (RUS) and Ukraine (UKR), 
and the last three letters point to what kind of actor they represent, 
educational (EDU), media (MED), judiciary (JUD), private (PTY), 
civilian (CVL), political opposition (OPP), business (BUS), rebel group 
(REB), governmental (GOV). 
 The ties represent the mean positive (or negative) Goldstein score of all 
interactions between two actors in a given month; two layers of data 
representing positive ties and negative ties in the network. The Goldstein 
score is a value measuring the level of conflict or cooperation in an event, 
with -10 being the most conflictual and 10 being the most cooperative.131 
An automated process extracts event data from news reports around the 
world and then through a language analysis engine categorizes the content 
as positive or negative.132 
                                                 
129 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “IARPA Announces BBN ACCENT Release to the 
Research Community,” news release, November 8, 2016, https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-
releases/press-releases-2016/item/1625-iarpa-announces-bbn-accent-release-to-the-research-community.  
130 Boschee et al., “ICEWS Coded Event Data.” 
131 Scott Althaus et al., “Cline Center Historical Phoenix Event Data, v.1.0.0,” Cline Center for 
Democracy, last modified June 26, 2017. http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/data/phoenix/ 
132 Boschee et al., “ICEWS Coded Event Data.” 
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 The time period for this analysis is January 2012 to January 2016, while 
the data range is monthly. This time period and range were selected to 
allow for two years of data on either side of the annexation of Crimea by 
Russia. 
 The networks are either networks of positive ties or networks of negative 
ties. 
C. METHODOLOGY  
To conduct network-level and node-level SNA and temporal analysis of the 
network, this study uses the Organizational Risk Analyzer (ORA),133 which allows us to 
identify visual changes in the network over time and identify important metrics, thus 
providing a more complete picture of the network at any given period. ORA’s Measure 
Over Time feature helps identify trends that otherwise may go unnoticed, and its Social 
Network Change Detection (SNCD) function can identify “statistically significant” 
periods of network change, as well as compare and contrast Russia and Ukraine. SNCD 
support analysts identify periods in which a single measure of centralization has a 
significant increase or decrease that is not explainable by random fluctuations in the 
data.134 
D. KEY TERMS 
Network centralization: This can be used to analyze a network and determine 
whether there are any nodes that are more central than others, that is, having higher 
centrality scores (degree, betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, and others). The more 
variation there is in centrality scores among the nodes, the higher the centralization 
score.135 
                                                 
133 “ORA-LITE: Software,” CASOS, n.d., http://www.casos.cs.cmu.edu/projects/ora/software.php.  
134 Sean F. Everton and Dan Cunningham, “Detecting Significant Changes in Dark Networks,” 
Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression 5, no. 2 (2013): 94–114, doi: 
10.1080/19434472.2012.725225.  
135 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 398. 
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Total Degree Centrality: Total degree centrality is a measure of the number of 
ties a node has to its neighbors.136 The degree centrality value can be directional; that is, 
in-degree for ties going into the node, and out-degree for ties going out from the node, 
and the total degree centrality value is a summary of both. Actors or organizations who 
are linked to many others assumes having access to their ideas, beliefs, and opinions and 
therefore are assumed to have a high influence potential. Those people are identified by 
the degree centrality in the specific social network. The higher values in this metric are 
equal to more connections to other actors in that specific network.137 
Closeness Centrality: The closeness centrality value describes the path distance 
between nodes in a specific network. It measures the path distance (i.e., number of ties) 
between each node and may indicate that the node with a high closeness value (i.e., is 
close to many other nodes) can disseminate information quickly but also is reached by 
information fast, too.138 
Eigenvector Centrality: This measurement counts the numbers of ties each node 
has but weights them by its neighbor’s centrality score. That is, a node’s eigenvector 
centrality is calculated by its ties to other nodes and their centrality scores.139 The 
eigenvector centrality assesses connections to other nodes with high centrality scores 
higher than nodes that are more on the periphery. It assumes that if a node has a neighbor 
with high centrality scores it may have high potential influencing that neighbor. 
Betweenness Centrality: This measures “the extent to which each actor lies on 
the shortest path between all other actors in a network.”140 The more often an actor lies 
on the shortest path between pairs of actors, the higher their betweenness score; if an 
actor does not lie on the shortest path between pair of actors, then its betweenness score 
                                                 
136 Everton, 399. 
137 Robert Hanneman and Mark Riddle, “Introduction to Social Network Methods: Chapter 10, 
Centrality and Power,” accessed May 3, 2018, 
http://www.faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C10_Centrality.html#Degree.  
138 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 398. 
139 Everton, 400. 
140 Everton, 397. 
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equals zero. Information is more likely to pass through actors with high betweenness 
scores, which may indicate a brokerage position (se definition below). 
Network density: This value indicates how connected a network is. It equals the 
ratio of actual ties over the total possible number of ties in a network. 
Fragmentation: Equals the proportion of unconnected pairs of actors in a 
network. A pair of actors is considered to be unconnected if they cannot reach one 
another (via a network path) either directly or indirectly.141 
Brokerage: A brokerage position within a network indicates that this node may 
have high influence potential but also that it could be a source of gathering information 
since the information between two networks most often needs to go through this 
brokerage. This study uses betweenness centrality to measure brokerage potential. 
Newman Groups (Community Detection): Newman group algorithms are a 
series of clustering algorithms that detect subgroups such that there are more ties within 
the subgroups than across them than one would expect “in a random graph of the same 
size with the same number of ties.” The optimal number of subgroups generally uses 
modularity as a measure of fit.142 
E. INITIAL ANALYSIS 
I first analyzed the network from January 2012 through January 2016. This 
allowed me to identify trends and shifts in the overall structure of the network. Next, I 
identified specific points in time that seemed interesting, points in time where metrics, 
such as the density of the network, had shifted dramatically. This allowed me to narrow 
the range of January 2012–January 2016 to August 2013–April 2014. By narrowing the 
range, I identified a specific period with the most interesting network-level and node-
level events shifts, the highest change in total density of the network. 
Sociograms (network maps) of Russia’s influence operations in Eastern Europe 
network relationships were coded and then visualized. The period from August 2013 to 
                                                 
141 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 401. 
142 Everton, 401. 
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April 2014 was chosen as the range because there appeared to be a dramatic shift in 
network centralization. Network centralization measures the difference between the most-
central nodes and the rest of the network. High values indicate that few nodes are very 
highly connected, and most have very few ties. In contrast, low values indicate that many 
nodes are highly connected, and most have many ties. There was a total degree 
centralization of 0.247 in August 2013 and 0.120 in April 2014, indicating that the nodes 
became much more highly connected with many more ties in April 2014. These dates 
coincide with the change in relationships between Russia and Ukraine during the Ukraine 
crisis and the annexation of Crimea. 
Based on the initial analysis, this study identified the standard centralization 
measures (degree, closeness, eigenvector, and betweenness) and network density, as the 
most interesting network-level measures warranting further investigation. This study also 
investigates standard centrality measures (degree, closeness, eigenvector, and 
betweenness) and brokerage positions at the node level. 
F. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This section will chronologically describe and visualize the different analyses and 
their results. 
1. January 2012–January 2016 Interactions (SNA Report) 
A total of 18 actors, not including isolates, were identified for the entire time 
period (January 2012–January 2016). Throughout that period, a total of 49 different 
networks among these actors where identified. Sixteen networks were in the beginning 
time period, 17 in the middle, and 16 in the end. Analysis was conducted for both 
positive and negative network interactions between Ukrainian-to-Ukrainian, Ukrainian-
to-Russian, and Russian-to-Russian actors. The results are shown in Tables 2–4. 
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Table 2.   Network Characteristics 
Negative Interactions Network 
Avg. Path Distance 
(Characteristic Path Length) 
Avg. 
Diameter 
January 2012–January 2016 11.605 30 
Positive Interactions Network 
Avg. Path Distance 
(Characteristic Path Length) 
Avg. 
Diameter 
January 2012–January 2016 0.883 3.492 
Table 3.   Negative Interactions (Centrality) 
Total Degree Closeness Eigenvector Betweenness 
0.265 0.158 0.466 0.313 
Table 4.   Positive Interactions (Centrality) 
Total Degree Closeness Eigenvector Betweenness 
0.205 0.060 0.594 0.225 
 
2. January 2012–January 2016 Interactions (Measures Over Time) 
Figures 3–6 (specifically 4 and 6) use social network change detection (SNCD) to 
highlight changes within a network by monitoring its topography (e.g., density, 
fragmentation, and centralization). Briefly put, SNCD allows for real-time analysis and 
can potentially alert analysts as to whether and when a sudden change has occurred in a 
network, and when compared with other sources of Human Intelligence (HUMINT), may 
explain possible causes for specific events. Significant changes are determined to occur 
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when a particular measure varies from a baseline at a rater greater than a predetermined 
threshold.143  
As identified by the measure charts, network density, network centralization, and 
their corresponding social network change detection (SNCD), each provides evidence 
that August 2013 and April 2014 are two of the most important periods—periods with the 
greatest shifts (positive and negative interactions) in value. ORA’s output can be 
confusing because it graphs both significant increases and decreases of a particular metric 
with lines that rise from the baseline. For example, in Figure 4 the red line indicates 
increases in network density while the blue line charts decreases. Similarly, the green line 
indicates increases in network fragmentation, while the yellow line tracks decreases. 
Looking at the figure, the red, blue, and green lines all cross the threshold (indicated by 
the red horizontal line), suggesting that significant changes did occur. The next step is to 
determine the time at which each change began to occur in order to identify what factors 
may have led to the significant changes. With SNCD, the time at which a significant 
change is deemed to have begun to occur is the point where the line leaves the baseline 
and begins to rise. 
                                                 
143 Everton and Cunningham, “Detecting Significant Changes in Dark Networks.” 
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The time points identified in Figure 4 (and Figure 6, which applies SNCD to 
network centralization) correlate with certain events that occurred between Ukraine and 
Russia. Specifically, in August 2012, Russia stopped all imports from Ukraine to 
Russia.144 It was an obvious move from Russia trying to coerce Ukraine not to sign the 
AA with the EU.145 In November, the Euromaidan civil unrest began, followed by lots of 
violence, especially from the governmental security forces and the protesters. This 
resulted in President Yanukovych’s resignation in February 2014, when a temporary 
government was established. On March 18, Russian President Putin signed a law that 
implied annexation of Crimea.146 
 
Figure 3.  Network Density and Fragmentation (January 2012–January 
2016) 
                                                 
144 David Herszenhorn, “Russia Putting a Strong Arm on Neighbors,” New York Times, October 23, 
2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/23/world/europe/russia-putting-a-strong-arm-on-neighbors.html.  
145 EU Association Agreement set out the core for cooperation and partnership between EU and other 
countries.  
146 “Putin Signs Laws on Reunification of Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia,” TASS, 
Russian News Agency, March 21, 2014, http://tass.com/russia/724785. 
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Figure 4.  Social Network Change Detection (Density and 
Fragmentation) (January 2012–January 2016) 
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Figure 5.  Network Centralization (January 2012–January 2016) 
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a. August 2013 Interactions (ORA Visualization #1) 
The sociogram shown in Figure 7 illustrates the August 2013 network (15 nodes 
and 81 ties) with isolates hidden and nodes colored by Newman group, links colored by 
positive (blue line) and negative (red line) ties, and links weighted by the number of 
interactions (thick lines indicate more interactions). As noted earlier, Newman Groups is 
an algorithm that detects subgroups within networks by comparing the pattern of ties 
between actors to a random network of the same size and density. If the level of 
interconnectedness between some actors is greater than one would expect strictly from 
random interactions, then it is seen as evidence that it a subgroup within the network.147 
 
Figure 7.  August 2013 Network; MDS Layout. 
                                                 
147 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 401. 
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 Newman groups shows two distinct subgroups; blue represents the largest 
with nine nodes (Russian); red represents the second largest with six nodes 
(Ukrainian). 
 Newman Modularity of 0.3454 indicates the grouping has a low degree of 
community structure; lower values indicate a weaker clustering (i.e., less 
community structure). The groups that Newman’s algorithm identifies 
make visual sense in the manner that the Newman group exhibits less 
community structure. 
 RUSGOV (Russian Government) and UKRGOV (Ukrainian Government) 
appear to occupy brokerage positions within the network. 
b. August 2013 Interactions (ORA Visualization #2) 
Figure 8 describes the network in August 2013, separated by types of interactions. 
Blue ties (15 nodes, 36 links) indicate positive interactions, and red ties indicate negative 
interactions. The Russian government holds a broker position within both networks. One 
can also derive a negative tie between Ukraine business and Russian government, which 
can be explained by the import embargo. The two major clusters consist of separate 
states, one of Ukraine (red nodes) and one of Russian groups (blue nodes). These 
visualizations highlight that there is a similar pattern between positive and negative 
interactions. The majority of ties are reciprocal except for a few, and there are both 
negative and positive ties between the same actors. However, the overall weight of the 
negative ties is much higher than the positive ties, revealing a conflicted environment.   
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Figure 8.  Network Visualization of the August 2013 Network. 
 58 
c. August 2013 Interactions (SNA Reports) 
There were 15 total nodes, fewer isolates, identified for the period of August 
2013. Analysis was conducted for network Agent × Agent Negative ties, for network 
Agent × Agent Positive ties, and for individual nodes. 
Analysis identified the following the rank of the top five actors in terms of degree, 
closeness, eigenvector, and betweenness centrality, as shown in Tables 5 and 6. Russia’s 
0.49 and Ukraine’s 0.47 betweenness scores in Table 5 are four times higher than the 
other actors, which confirm their strong brokerage positions. Ukraine’s relatively high 
score in eigenvector centrality (0.8) is explained to its tie to Russia, which is a highly 
centralized actor with many ties to other actors. The closeness centrality scores, which 
are quite even between the top five actors in both table five and six, reveal that it is a 
highly connected network where every actor has a relatively high potential to disseminate 
information. 
Table 5.   Positive Interactions 















































Table 6.   Negative Interactions 















































Since the negative and positive networks do not differ significantly in scores, 
these tables look similar, and the analysis confirms only the first more broad analysis of 
2012-2016. Russia’s dominance in eigenvector centrality indicate a more negative 
dissemination of information than Ukraine’s relatively positive. 
ORA identified the following recurring top-ranked agents from ORA’s standard 
SNA report for the August 2013 network (Positive and Negative Interactions), as shown 
in Table 7. 
Table 7.   Recurring Top-Ranked Agents in 2013 
Ranking 






5 5-way tie for fifth place 
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These tables describe what one might expect regarding the Russian and the 
Ukrainian governments as central actors, especially due to degree centrality. Remarkably, 
though, these are the top-ranked actors in eigenvector centrality. These are, except for the 
Ukrainian government, only Ukrainian sub-state actors such as the opposition, business 
affiliates, private sector, and civilian organizations. As mentioned earlier in this study, the 
eigenvector measures eventual influence capability, and in this case may be actors 
vulnerable to Russian influence operations. 
These visualizations describe both the Ukraine and Russian governments as 
central actors throughout several measurements. Analyzing the top actors according to 
eigenvector and brokerage potential, however, one can derive, especially by looking at 
the positive ties, that sub-state actors play a significant role. The top-ranked actors in the 
brokerage measurement (betweenness centrality) are civilian actors and private 
organizations that might have an indirect influence potential.  
d. April 2014 Interactions (ORA Visualization #1) 
Figure 9 illustrates the network in April 2014, with isolate nodes hidden. Notice 
that there are 18 nodes and 140 ties; positive ties are represented by the blue lines and 
negative ties are represented by the red lines. During this time, there was a network 
centralization—total degree of 0.700. This represented a major shift in the total number 
of interactions, both positive and negative; the network appears to be much denser, and 
apparent brokerage roles have disappeared. 
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Figure 9.  ORA Visualization of the April 2014 Network.  
Figure 9 illustrates the April 2014 network (18 nodes and 140 ties) with isolate 
nodes hidden, nodes colored by Newman Grouping, links colored by positive (blue line) 
and negative (red line) ties, and links weighted by the number of interactions (thick lines 
indicate more interactions). 
 Newman groups shows two distinct subgroups; blue represents the largest 
with 11 nodes (nine Russian, two Ukrainian), red represents the second 
grouping with seven nodes (seven Ukrainian). 
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 Newman Modularity of 0.1766 indicates the grouping has a low degree of 
community structure; lower values indicate a weaker clustering (i.e., less 
community structure). The groups that Newman’s algorithm identifies 
make visual sense in the manner that the Newman group exhibits less 
community structure. 
 Easily identifiable brokerage positions no longer are readily apparent 
within the network. 
This analysis highlights the balance between positive and negative interactions, 
showing why this network can be described as conflictual. The Ukrainian government is 
assigned to the same network/cluster as the majority of the Russian nodes, which may be 
explained by the negative interactions with the Russian actors. Moreover, this analysis 
also reveals a path of exclusively positive ties between Ukrainian business, Ukrainian 
opposition, Russian rebels, and Russian business affiliates.  
e. April 2014 Interactions (ORA Visualization #2) 
Figure 10 depicts the network in April 2014, divided into separate negative and 
positive visualizations. The networks are much denser, and there are no well-defined 
subgroups as in August 2013. In the positive interaction network, there are 18 nodes and 
69 links. In the negative interaction network, there are 18 nodes and 71 links. The 
Russian and Ukraine governments do still hold a central position, but now the other 
actors have many more interactions than before. There is an increase of both positive and 
negative ties, but it is difficult to derive any specific conclusions from that. Remarkable, 
however, is the increase of interactions, both positive and negative, and the increase of 
actors, or more specifically, a lack of isolates. This time frame highlights an event where 
Russia violates Ukraine’s sovereignty. In that situation, one may expect the opposite, that 
is, a decrease of interactions due to hostility. 
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Figure 10.  Network Visualizations of the April 2014 Network 
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f. April 2014 Interactions (SNA Reports) 
Eighteen total nodes, less isolates, were identified for the April 2014 period. 
Analysis was conducted for network Agent × Agent Negative ties, network Agent × 
Agent Positive ties, and individual nodes. 
ORA’s standard SNA report for the April 2014 network identified the rank of the 
top five actors in terms of degree, closeness, eigenvector, and betweenness centrality, as 
shown in Tables 8 and 9. Compared to the August 2013, the closeness centrality score is 
about sixteen times higher and emphasize a network where actors are more close to each 
other. This implies that each actor has more potential to disseminate information. Also, 
the betweenness centrality scores reveal that Russian civilian actors may have a better 
brokerage potential in 2014 due to higher scores, similar to the Russian and Ukrainian 
governmental organizations.  
Table 8.   Positive Interactions 















































Table 9.   Negative Interactions 
















































ORA identified the following recurring top-ranked agents from ORA’s standard 
SNA report for the April 2014 network (Positive and Negative Interactions) as shown in 
Table 10. 
Table 10.   Recurring Top-Ranked Agents 2014 
Ranking 






5 4-way tie for fifth place 
 
In these tables, one can observe that the Ukrainian and Russian governments still 
hold the top positions. The differences in these tables are the changes in actors, especially 
within the eigenvector centrality. The eigenvector centrality’s top-ranked actors are now 
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Russian actors, meaning that Russia now might have more capacity for indirect influence. 
One can also derive the shift in the presence of different rebel groups that might have 
more interests within the society at this time. Moreover, from these tables, one can 
observe an increase in Ukrainian education affiliates within the brokerage position. The 
measurements overall have increased in value, but the positive interactions have 
decreased. The distribution of the tables is, other than for minor changes, the same as it 
was in August except for the rise in nongovernmental organizations’ measurement 
values, indicating more indirect influence.  
G. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF UKRAINE 
SNA can contribute to the understanding of covert groups, but researchers need to 
be aware of the limitations of drawing conclusions from SNA alone. Here are the key 
findings regarding the use of SNA.  
1. Ties matter for analysis. 
2. Incorrect, insufficient, or inadequate data may lead to false results.  
3. Hybrid networks, such as this network, often include relations that create 
trust, competition, and dependencies among members that traditional 
metrics, such as centrality measures, cannot capture.  
4. In covert network analysis, analysis of complex networks often requires 
disaggregation into smaller components that allow each relationship type 
to better understand the meaning and the structure of network ties. 
This chapter has tried to analyze how the environment evolves through a crisis but 
also how Russia might use its state power tools to influence other countries. The purpose 
was to highlight changes in the Ukraine crisis that might be useful to adapt for other 
countries to anticipate Russia’s subversion. Validating general conclusions from this 
study may be difficult when this is only a single case study from a single dataset. Further 
studies where Russia is involved must be undertaken. Nonetheless, this study reveals a 
significant change between August 2013 and April 2014, which most likely is explained 
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by the rise of the civil unrest and the evolution of the crisis. The ties have changed from 
being clustered into two significant groups of Russian and Ukrainian actors to a network 
with low centrality but higher density. 
One should expect stability and cooperation throughout a crisis within a country 
when influenced by a foreign adversary. This study highlights the increase of interactions 
within the network, which might indicate cooperation. However, one may expect a 
decrease in cooperation between actors in Ukraine and Russia’s counterpart due to 
hostilities, but this seems not to be the case. Rather the opposite appears to have occurred. 
This is why this might indicate some kind of will to influence different actors within the 
exposed country, in this case, Russia influencing Ukraine. This relative instability can 
create opportunities that favor either part that aims to subvert the legal authorities. 
The interactions between NGOs are clear and their ranks in the measurements 
related to indirect influence, such as brokerage potential and eigenvector centrality, are 
high. Nevertheless, influencing people means influencing those who make decisions. 
This study collected and analyzed data from the human environment according to the 
categories by Lee and Fussell, by “mapping key conditions of insurgency development, 
pathways of interaction, and nodes of influence,” and revealed that one can build a good 
roadmap for crafting strategies to counter subversion.148 Furthermore, this study revealed 
Russia’s preferred methods to subvert the Ukrainian political environment and Ukrainian 
society as a whole were by working through NGOs and in the fog of compatriots and by 
using economic influence.  
The role of indirect influence is even more important today when the use of social 
media and other information channels rapidly disseminate information, for example, the 
use of unauthorized military violence, such as the Eastern Ukraine 2014. The network of 
April 2014 highlights the importance of cooperation between different agencies within 
one’s country to be able to alert decision makers when changes in network structure 
occurs but also to be able to prevent destabilization of the country. Unity and joint 
operations are the future for defense. 
                                                 
148 Fussell and Lee, “Networks at War,” 380. 
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VII. CASE STUDY OF ESTONIA 
One of Russia’s main objectives is to weaken the unity of the international system 
of Western-friendly countries, more specifically the EU and NATO, which are its greatest 
threat.149 Estonia, which shares a border with Russia and is a member of both the EU and 
NATO, is no exception. With its geographical location between the Baltic Sea and 
Russia, it has definitely a place in Russia’s sphere of interests, also known as its “buffer” 
zone. Since Estonia lacks any significant natural resources or other assets essential for 
Russia, however, Russia can be more aggressive in its subversive operations aimed to 
disrupt the society and dissolve the political process.150 Subversive actions are a key to 
success for Russia due to Estonia’s membership in NATO, and the membership initially 
excluded Russia’s use of conventional armed forces. NATO membership protects Estonia 
through the deterrence factor, which may be the biggest difference compared to Ukraine. 
Even though the differences between Estonia and Ukraine are many, the two countries 
share striking similarities of Russian involvement within their respective societies, 
especially within the four SMT-derived domains—political, social, informational, and 
economical.  
A. OUTLINE OF THIS CHAPTER 
In this chapter, I focus on Estonia and analyze events confirming indicators 
gleaned from the political process model. By using derived indicators from the Ukraine 
case study, one may see similar patterns within Estonia. First, I briefly summarize the 
historical perspective to enhance the environmental understanding but also to enhance 
understanding of the different sectors of the society. Secondly, I analyze chronologically 
the domains derived from the political process model to highlight similarities and 
differences between the events that occurred in Ukraine. Finally, I present conclusions 
drawn from the findings and a comparison of the indicators achieved from the Ukraine 
case study to either dismiss or confirm indicators of Russia’s subversive operations. 
                                                 
149 Estonian Internal Security Service, Annual Review 2013 (Tallinn: Internal Security Service, 2013), 
6, https://www.kapo.ee/sites/default/files/public/content_page/Annual%20Review%202013.pdf.  
150 Estonian Information Board, International Security and Estonia, 19. 
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B. HISTORICAL BACKDROP 
Along with many other Eastern European countries after World War II, Estonia 
was forced to adopt the Russian way of life. Traditions, culture, and rules, but also the 
Russian language, were imposed. Russian architecture was also imposed on structures 
such as official government buildings and military installations.151 The Russian heritage 
is represented in part of the society even today. 
Similar to Ukraine, Estonia gained its independence in 1991 with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. It became a member of both the EU and NATO in 2004, along with the 
other Baltic states, Latvia and Lithuania.152 Estonia is a rather small country, bordering 
Russia to the east and Baltic Sea to the west. Its population is about 1.2 million, about 70 
percent of whom are Estonians, 25 percent Russians, and 5 percent other ethnic groups. 
The Russian population in Estonia is proportionally larger than in Ukraine where the 
Russians are only about 17 percent of the population.153 Only 50 percent of the Russians 
in Estonia have Estonian citizenship, a critical condition used by Russia when creating a 
narrative that Estonia does not take care of its Russians and therefore they should demand 
Russia’s support and involvement.154 Estonia’s development since its independence has 
been far greater than its southern allies, Latvia and Lithuania. It ranks high in categories 
such as education and press freedom and has had a steep development curve within the 
technology sector.  
C. THE POLITICAL DOMAIN 
Despite Estonia’s well-developed technological industry and its membership in 
NATO, its political system lacks stability and experienced leaders. A weak governmental 
framework and an unbalanced institutional bureaucracy, a leftover from the Soviet era, 
                                                 
151 Heather A. Conley et al., Russian Soft Power in the 21st Century: An Examination of Russian 
Compatriot Policy in Estonia; A Report of the CSIS Europe Program (Washington, DC: Center for 
Strategic & International Studies, 2011), 1. 
152 “Estonia,” The World Factbook, Central Intelligence Agency, last modified May 10, 2018, accessed 
May 7, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/Library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/en.html.  
153 “Estonia.” 
154 Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, Estonia, Intervention on Naturalization in Estonia 
(Vienna: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, October 6, 2008), 
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make Estonia susceptible to Russian influence.155 Sometimes there are ties between 
political organizations and business affiliates where the funding of different parties is 
blurred, opening the door for political opportunities.156 
Unfortunately, the relatively large Russian minority has not been given the chance 
to receive Estonian citizenship. The Center Party, representing about 80 percent of the 
Russian-speaking population in Estonia,157 is a strong supporter of the Russian 
compatriot policy and leverages the citizenship issue to gain popularity among Russians. 
Furthermore, the Center Party is strongly connected to the pro-Putin party, United Russia, 
and has a specific agreement for close cooperation.158 This makes the connection to 
Russia obvious, and it is also where the Center Party gets its agenda. 
In 2010, the Estonian Internal Security Service released its annual report that 
revealed information about the Center Party’s connection to Russia. More specifically, 
the leader of the party, through his connections to Russian sponsors, had been able to 
build a Russian Orthodox church in an area of Tallin where most of the Russian people 
are situated.159 The same thing happened in 2013 in Paldiski. Another church was built 
funded by an Estonian-Russian businessman in an area heavily populated by Russians 
and in a town where governmental control was low.160 These events clearly point out the 
Russian government’s use of the Russian population in general, but through the church 
more specifically, to gain control and influence. Leveraging a very large number of 
Russian people against local politics is an effective tool in the subversion toolbox.161 
In 2011, Russian involvement within the political environment continued. Prior to 
the parliamentary election in Estonia, a propaganda film elevating the leader of the 
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Center Party was broadcast by a Russian media agency. That media agency has its office 
in Moscow and does not have any local offices or other connections within Estonia, but 
announced this information just days before the election. The actions of this media 
agency, with no direct connections to Estonia, and its interest in an Estonian party leader 
are hard to explain other than to indirectly influence the political environment to create 
conditions favorable to Russian interests.162 
D. THE ECONOMIC DOMAIN 
Compared to Ukraine and the other Baltic states, Estonia is less dependent on the 
Russian energy sector. Yet, historical remnants and old infrastructure still keep Estonia in 
the grip of Russian organizations. That said, they are not fully independent, especially not 
regarding the natural gas sector. The huge Russian energy company Gazprom plays a 
significant role in Estonia, as it did in Ukraine.163 Gazprom uses economic factors to gain 
control over certain areas in the society trying to influence decision makers and makes a 
statement if governments and their decision makers do not align with Russian interests. In 
May 2007, Russian oil dealers stopped using the port of Tallinn and instead used their 
port in St. Petersburg to export oil products. The impact of this embargo on the Estonian 
economy was significant. The economic impact on those business affiliates that used to 
work with the Russian exports was devastating, which influenced decision makers not 
only at the local level but also at the regional level. The largest oil company that used to 
export oil through Tallinn was owned by Gazprom.164 This embargo happened at the 
same time as a protest against Estonia’s decision to move a Russian statue located in 
Tallinn.  
Overall, Russia’s and Estonia’s trading market has had a positive development 
since Estonia’s independence. Russia is one of Estonia’s largest export markets, and 
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exports have increased ever since independence, apart from the economic crisis in 
2009.165 Still, it is a cooperation most often ruled by Russia and settled with several 
obstacles. First, no trade agreement with equal rights and obligations exists between the 
two countries. The rules are most often set to Russia’s advantage. Also, Russia refuses to 
recognize the Estonian health and safety certificates from Estonian producers and 
approves certificates only from their own organizations.166 
E. THE SOCIAL DOMAIN 
The history of the Soviet Union’s occupation of Estonia and the outcome of 
World War II divides the majority of Estonians’ and Russians’ perspectives on Russia 
either as liberators from the Nazis or as an occupying force.167 This was obvious in 2007 
when a Soviet monument was moved from the city center of Tallinn to a cemetery 
outside the city. It was a bronze statue supposed to remind the Estonian people about the 
Soviet occupation. Many Estonians saw the statue as a reminder of the Russian influence 
in the society and did not subscribe to the story it told, but many Russians felt that they 
had been insulted and that the Estonian society had minimized the importance of the 
historical Russian involvement. Moving the statue to a cemetery could be questioned 
from an outside perspective and was also used by Russia as an ignitor to develop a civil 
unrest, named the “Bronze Night.” A frigid diplomatic relationship between Estonia and 
Russia emerged from this event.168 What followed, except for the diplomatic 
complications, were economic constraints, a cyberattack apparently originating from 
Russia, and an information operation trying to discredit Estonia and its decision makers. 
Within the social domain, SMT emphasizes the importance of already existing 
organizations. In Estonia, however, new Russian media agencies and websites have 
emerged. The use of the Russian population in Estonia as a complement to the lack of 
existing organizations to leverage influence and as a power tool to destabilize the 
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political discourse is obvious. These organizations are coordinated through coordination 
councils manned from the Russian embassy in order to collect NGOs and affiliates that 
support Russian objectives or otherwise promote the Russian way of living.169 
In 2008, Russkiy Mir established a language center located in the middle of 
Tallinn. It became a hub for the dissemination of Russian information. In 2009, Russkiy 
Mir merged their organizational objectives with those of the Russian Federal Agency 
responsible for the compatriot policy, Rossotrudnichestvo. This defined its ties to Russia 
and created a platform for Russia to influence the narrative.170 
The effort against Russian influences in Estonian society has been an ongoing 
process. One major issue among decision makers is about what the official language 
spoken in Estonia should be and difficulties with integrating the Russian population into 
the society. These issues are similar to those identified in the Ukraine study. To justify 
Russia’s interference within the decision-making processes of other countries, neutral 
NGOs, funded by the Kremlin, are used to create a narrative and report human rights 
crimes. Two of those are the Legal Information Centers for Human Rights (LICHR) and 
the Russian School in Estonia. Through these organizations, Russia can decide what kind 
of narrative should be broadcast and can use these sources later on to argue that the 
information came from an independent third party.171 The organization Russian 
Schooling, founded in 2010, was exactly such an organization. It was seen as a response 
to the strict policy against the Russian language and promoted the Russian way of life 
and culture.172 
In June 2010, the organization Mir bez Natsizma (World Without Nazism 
[WWN]) was founded in Kiev. Their agenda is said to be a human rights movement 
working against neo-Nazism, but more specifically, against mistreatment of Russian 
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minorities abroad.173 Their leadership consists of people who used to be members of 
Nochnoi Dozor (Night Watch) and has strong ties to the Russian government. Night 
Watch was the leading organization in the unrest following the movement of the bronze 
statue. World without Nazism is described as one of the most influential NGOs defending 
Russia’s interests abroad.174 In March 2011, a new NGO emerged named Nazi-Free 
Estonia. It had its founding meeting in Tallinn and seems to belong to the same network 
as World Without Nazism.175 The Nazi topic is often used when trying to discredit 
leaders or decision makers by accusing them of being Nazis or having connections to 
Nazi organizations. Quite often, these organizations compare how Russians abroad are 
treated by the societies they live in to Nazi-like treatment.176 
In 2008, Galina Sapozhnikova, a journalist for the Russian newspaper 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, and Igor Teterin, an Estonian entrepreneur, founded a media 
club called Impressum, which has been accused of promoting anti-Estonian propaganda 
and at the same time glorifying Russia. In December 2011, it held a meeting where the 
guests could sign a petition against a political reform conducted by the Estonian 
government at that time.177 In 2009, the club Format-A3 was created in Crimea, which is 
pretty similar to Impressum, with the same guest speakers and speaking points. In 
September 2010, the media club expanded into Ukraine but under another name, 
Skovoroda Club, in Kiev. Its founder was Dmitry Kiselyov, who became the director of 
Rossiya Segodnya, the new media agency created by Putin in 2013 by merging RIA 
Novosti and the radio station Golos Rossi.178 
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Questioning historical events and disseminating a pro-Russian perspective is 
another tool used by Russia to influence people’s opinions and perspectives. The 
Historical Memory Foundation, founded in 2008, claims it conducts research on and 
analyzes historical events in Russia and its eastern neighbors.179 The group’s actions, 
however, suggest something different. The foundation seems to pay more attention to the 
resistance movements in the Baltic states and Ukraine, and tries to create a narrative in 
which the participants in resistance movements were selfish and cruel at that time. In 
2010, the foundation created a database containing the names of victims of the armed 
resistance in the Baltic states, Ukraine, and Belarus.180 Another historically focused 
organization is the Baltic Research Center. Founded in 2012, the Baltic Research Center 
questions the historical view of the Baltic states and argues that they emerged from the 
former Russian Empire and thus are meant for “internal consumption.”181 
In 2010, the fund Amber Bridge was established by Russian sponsors, whose 
main objective has been to increase information sharing between Russia and the Baltic 
states and to enhance economic cooperation between the countries. They argue that 
different assessments of historical events are the greatest obstacle for deeper 
relationships. Their interests are also in the transit, environmental, and energy sectors, 
and they want to facilitate the exchange of students between universities. These are all 
programs that already exist in the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS) where Russia is 
already a member; thus, this can only be described as Russia’s use of soft power to feed 
its own narrative.182 
For Russia to be able to spread its information and influence societies, it requires 
a credible spokesperson. In 2012, the Fund for the Legal Protection and Support of 
Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad was established to train, fund, and 
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support such spokespersons and related organizations. One of the organizations was the 
Tallinn-based Legal Information Center for Human Rights (LICHR), which in 2014 
organized a conference in Tallinn. The conference focused on a narrative that painted 
Estonia just as the Russian strategy desired, as a divided society that violates the human 
rights of the Russian-speaking people.183 The Fund for the Legal Protection and Support 
of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad and its members are supporters of the 
annexation of Crimea, and the organization very often supports court cases related to 
people linked to Russian special services. Moreover, many of its members have ties to 
special services in Russia.184 
Russia uses media projects as another tool of influence. In October 2014, a media 
website called the Baltnews emerged as a Russian language news portal. It was a project 
that disseminated information through all the Baltic countries. The project was funded by 
Rossiya Segodnya (Russia Today), also active in Ukraine, which was established in 2013 
as the Russian state information agency. The Baltnews project targeted the Russian-
speaking population abroad and was coordinated by employees of Rossiya Segodnya, 
which also managed and coordinated what was broadcast and when programs were 
broadcast. They also coordinated another media project named Sputnik.185 Sputnik was 
developed and funded by the same organization as the Baltnews, Russia Today, which 
broadcast in about 34 different languages. In 2014, Sputnik advertised to recruit 
journalists in Estonia in order to broaden its coverage of Russian news in Estonia. The 
network of both Sputnik and Russia Today are closely linked to organizations and people 
active in Russian compatriot policy and also has ties to other Russian governmental 
organizations in the Kremlin.186 It was not until 2015 that Rossiya Segodnya tried to 
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establish an office in Estonia along with an Estonian and Russian language portal, and in 
February 2016, Sputnik launched its Estonian website.187 
In 2016, the Russian influence operations continued. The Russian Association for 
Baltic Studies (RAPI), which aims to bring together researchers of the Baltic states, and 
another discussion club named Yamburg, whose purpose was to unite researchers and 
experts and to strengthen ties with the Baltic states, were established and presented at the 
Rossiya Segodnya press center in Moscow. The messages coming from those foundations 
follow the typical pattern of Russia’s influence operations: identifying the Baltic states as 
a problem area, declaring that Russian people are being discriminated against there, and a 
falsifying of the history.188 
F. THE INFORMATIONAL DOMAIN 
The 2007 unrest over the bronze statue was followed by a wave of cyberattacks 
on websites connected to Estonian media and governmental organizations. No clear 
evidence pointed to a specific country, but much evidence indicated involvement of 
Russian individuals through their IP addresses.189 Then, in 2010, the bronze statue lost its 
value as a tool to leverage propaganda and conflicts for Russia. Russia had to find 
another event to engage when disseminating its narrative of Russia as a deliverer of 
salvation. Russia tried to build a message that all opposition to Soviet occupation was an 
act of Nazism. Therefore, Russia turned its focus to an annual event involving soldiers 
who had fought in World War II. These events were covered by an unusually high 
number of Russian journalists describing the event as an attempt to change the historical 
case and as Nazi rallies sponsored by the Estonian government. Boris Sphigel, a member 
of the Federation Council of Russia, Dmitri Kondrashov, a Russian activist for Russia’s 
compatriot policy, and Andrei Zarenkov, also an activist emphasizing the compatriot 
policy, financed and organized the Nochnoi Dozor’s demonstration aiming to provoke 
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confrontations during the main events that year.190 Russia continued to build its narrative 
that the Soviet Union was the liberator and that the resistance from the current Estonian 
government is an example of pro-Nazism.191 
In 2011, Russia’s accusations of Estonia as a promoter of neo-Nazism and crimes 
against human rights continued. The media-club Impressum organized a public meeting 
covering the tense relationship between Russia and Estonia, and media continued to 
cover people who questioned the history as it is told today and instead wanted to derive a 
more Russian-friendly approach.192 This was reinforced by a high-ranking Russian 
officer’s speech in Riga “attacking the Baltic states for promoting fascism and human 
rights violations against their Russian-speaking minorities.”193 In 2014, Boris Spiegel, an 
activist and member of World Without Nazism, received a financial grant from the 
Russian president, and with those contributions, the WWN organized a youth conference 
titled “Youth for a Nazism-Free World.” 
The use of youth organizations is leveraged both domestically in Russia as an 
influence tool but also abroad where it wants to disseminate its agenda. In May 2013, a 
youth organization, Young Word, organized a conference in Estonia that emphasized 
military characteristics such as courage and bravery. It was supported by the Russian 
embassy in Estonia and the Estonian Orthodox church.194 Moreover, every year a Russian 
youth camp named Soyuz, dedicated to the memory of the Russian Empire and its victory 
in World War II is held in Russia by the Rossotrudnichestvo and an association called 
The Courage of the Fatherland. It has a military and athletic theme, and participants are 
invited from Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and the Baltic 
states. In September 2013, the location changed to Odessa, Ukraine. The Soyuz event 
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was highly covered by the larger news agencies in Russia, as well as other Russian 
governmental organizations.195 
In order for the compatriot policy to be successful, Russia needs either to 
segregate people or make them feel segregated and undermine the integration process by 
trying to make them dependent on Russia. Russia justifies its interference in other 
countries’ politics and internal affairs by leaning on its compatriot policy. They speak 
about human rights and argue that Russia has a responsibility to protect its people abroad 
when they engage in different events in other countries. For example, the Fund for the 
Legal Protection and Support of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad, founded 
in 2012, was established in Estonia to support and finance pro-Russian organizations in 
order for them to work toward Russia’s foreign policy objectives. The fund supported the 
participation of World Without Nazism’s activists in OSCE conferences and also for 
WWN to be able to organize its General Assembly in Strasbourg. The WWN has an 
annual seminar to remember that the Red Army conquered Tallinn.196 
By building this network, Russia can implement its information operations 
through legal organizations in other countries under the flag of compatriot policy. An 
example is the Legal Information Center for Human Rights in Estonia, developed in 2012 
by Alexey Semyonov, who is a member of Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots. 
The council is led by the local embassy of the Russian Federation.197 
Moreover, the media is a significant tool when framing different narratives. In 
early spring 2010, a film crew from the Russian TV channel 5 came to Estonia to 
document the life of Russians living there. It was told to create a story of a creative 
society with engaged people, but when broadcast, it turned out to be the opposite. It was 
perfectly tailored to Russia’s propaganda narrative that Estonia was far better when 
belonging to the Soviet Union and that the Russian people living in Estonia are 
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oppressed.198 In August 2015, a Russian TV crew from the Russian TV channel Rossiya 
visited Estonia and later broadcast a news program that smeared the Estonian TV channel 
ETV+. ETV+ is a Russian-language TV channel broadcasting Russian news from an 
Estonian perspective.199 
All these information operations clearly aim at creating an environment that is 
unfavorable to the Russian people in Estonia or at least designed to create a feeling of 
being mistreated. This both creates incentives for people to rise up and protest but also 
frames the narrative to gather masses of people. Russia’s compatriot policy tries to 
connect the Russian-speaking population living abroad, more specifically in Russia’s 
areas of interest, with foreign policy objectivesas it is in Estonia. By uniting the 
Russian-speaking people under Russian authorities and leadership, such as the 
Government Commission on Compatriots Living Abroad, the Russian Foreign Ministry, 
and Russian embassies, Russia can more easily distribute information and use Russian-
speaking people as a tool when meddling in other states’ political decision making. Using 
this kind of soft power makes it more difficult for governments to target a specific area 
that is an obvious threat to them.200 The Russian national agency, Rossotrudnichestvo, 
which was founded in 2008 by the Russian government, was in 2013 defined as a 
department in the Russian Federation, whose main tasks are developing and running 
Russia’s foreign policy. Rossotrudnichestvo is responsible for the compatriot policy but 
more specifically for assisting the development of humanitarian cooperation and other 
support based on the compatriot strategy. Konstantin Kosachev, director of the 
Rossotrudnichestvo, emphasized the importance of independent organizations of 
Russians abroad to show why a closer cooperation with Russian businessmen should be 
established. This forced the local Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots to change 
in 2013 by dividing into several sectors, where one had an economic focus with the goal 
of finding both Russian and local businessmen ready to support the compatriot policy.201 
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Another common tool for Russia is the use of people promoting anti-Estonian 
narratives at events of an international character. Funding and supporting those actors has 
been used historically. In September 2016, representatives from the Legal Information 
Center for Human Rights and the Russian School in Estonia participated in an event 
organized by the OSCE (Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights) covering 
subjects like human rights and integration. The Fund for the Legal Protection and Support 
of Russian Federation Compatriots Living Abroad paid for these organizations’ 
participation. The message these organizations spread was about the violation of 
language rights and that Russians without Estonian citizenship created a heavy burden for 
the Estonian society. The message was designed to thwart a sense of belonging among 
Russians in Estonian society.202 In September 2011, a campaign symbolized by a white 
ribbon was launched to support Russian schools that did not want to be taught the 
Estonian language. The campaign was supported by Night Watch, which also organized a 
couple of demonstrations. By analyzing the participants and the organizers, however, one 
could observe that there were almost no students or parents protesting and that the 
connection to the Russian government was clear.203 
Another way of gaining influence is to give money to political parties in foreign 
countries or to offer lucrative positions in companies to former politicians. These 
companies are often owned by or closely related to the Russian government. Other 
Russian government foundations and media companies support different nonprofit 
organizations, including Estonian nonprofits.204 
Finally, in 2016 NATO decided to pre-position battlegroups in the Baltic states. 
This created an aggressive propaganda reaction from Russia, both in the media and in 
political messaging. In Estonia, a handful of extremist activities spreading anti-NATO 
messages emerged but to no great effect in Estonian society. Nonetheless, the Russian 
media picked up the news and spread it widely to demonstrate the anti-NATO wave in 
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Estonia.205 A similar event occurred in 2016 when Russia delegated a skinhead from St. 
Petersburg to participate in a memorial event in Estonia. When arriving at the event, he 
had clothes that revealed neo-Nazi symbols. This was captured by the Kremlin-controlled 
media, which broadcast this as the social problem in Estonian society. Fortunately, the 
Estonian Internal Secret Service had control over this and highlighted the event to 
discredit the attempt. Other attempts to gain influence in the society emerged in 2016. 
Konstantin Zatulin, blacklisted in Ukraine from 2006 to 2008, tried to become a 
politician, representing the Russian-speaking people. His campaign was covered by the 
Russian TV channel Tsargrad, owned by Konstantin Malofeyev.206 Malofeyev, who is on 
the EU’s sanctions list, is a wealthy Russian businessman with strong connections to 
Putin. He also runs Russia’s largest foundation, St. Basil the Great Foundation.207 
G. CONCLUSIONS ABOUT RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN ESTONIA 
The similarities to Ukraine are obvious and Russian interference is sometimes 
even more apparent in Estonia. It could be because of stronger control at the 
governmental level but also because Russia may have a stronger posture in Estonia than 
in Ukraine.  
Russia’s operations in Estonia aim to influence society in such a way that society 
becomes diverse and lack unity. Russia utilizes the depth of the divided ethnic society, 
and the success of the compatriot policy is striking. The events in the different domains 
are highly influenced by dissemination of pro-Russian narratives, and the use of both 
existing but also newly created organizations on a sub-state level is common. Different 
organizations and institutes, registered as research institutions, are platforms used to build 
credibility in the dissemination of information within the Russian strategy. Defending the 
rights of Russian-speaking people has been used as a pretext for Russia before to 
intervene in internal affairs, such as in Ukraine.208 
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Russia’s strategic objectives are to weaken the unity of the international system, 
but more specifically, the EU and NATO, which they see as a threat. Information 
operations enable the Russian government to divide and rule different states in order to 
influence public opinion and discredit the democratic process. Furthermore, information 
operations are designed to make the Russian way of life more attractive. By using its 
compatriot policy, which aims to segregate ethnic Russians from the society in Estonia 
and to defame Estonia’s social and political leadership, Russia creates an unfavorable 
situation by generating mistrust. The events described in this chapter hinder other 
countries, but especially Estonia, from establishing closer ties to the West. The cultural 
centers are their foundations and serve as a tool to disperse Russian influence in a legal 
way and to depict Russia as the only alternative.209 
Finally, support of political dissidents and funding of their activities, often 
through surrogates, is a tool for causing tensions within a state. The resulting tensions 
create political opportunities for Russia to utilize, not necessarily today but maybe 
tomorrow, when international pressure has become too great for the Russian government 
to handle.  
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VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In general, Western countries promote democratic society as a role model for 
other countries to follow. From diplomatic channels to military engagements, Western 
ambassadors, politicians, and military personnel try to convince their partners that 
democracy is “the way to go.” The democratic process works as a mechanism for the 
average citizen to engage in decision making and thereby influence their situation in life, 
most often by elections or other processes where the will of the people plays a significant 
role. This makes the decisions made by the democratic instrument difficult to question 
and even harder to overrule. It is the will of the people in a democratic structure that is 
promoted as the key ingredient in a functioning, equal, and fair society. 
Unfortunately, the democratic process has lately been Western societies’ most 
vulnerable domain. Its attempted comeback as a superpower has proved to be more 
difficult than expected for Russia. Strong alliances and other agreements between 
Russia’s antagonists and Russia’s lack of a modern military compounds this challenge. 
This has forced Russia to find other ways to compete in the world arena. Its lack of 
deterrence power forces Russia to leverage some kind of relative power to influence 
foreign countries and their decision making, most often to prevent countries from 
strengthening their relationships with Western alliances (NATO) and the United States. A 
very efficient strategy that has been used recently is subversion, which is defined as “a 
systematic attempt to overthrow or undermine a government or political system by 
persons working secretly from within.”210 The military equivalent to this is 
unconventional warfare, which is defined as “activities conducted to enable a resistance 
movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying 
power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a 
denied area.”211 Based on this research project, I conclude that Russia’s strategy exploits 
democratic rights through democratic institutions by leveraging the will of the people, an 
                                                 
210 Merriam-Webster, “subversion.” 
211 DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Accessed August 6, 2017, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/dictionary.pdf.  
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approach Russia calls its “compatriot policy.” Working through legal institutions like 
cultural centers and volunteer organizations, Russia creates a platform for further 
operations to undermine governments and political systems. From these platforms, Russia 
builds networks within the society and uses the human domain and the potential of social 
movements.  
Unfortunately, most Western countries are unprepared for this and lack methods 
and knowledge about how to confront these operations. Understanding and anticipating 
the changing tactics are crucial to preventing Russia from influencing the democratic 
process in general and the political decision-making process more specifically. 
This thesis research concludes that one can use SMTs to frame areas of interest in 
societies where subversive actions may take place and to identify indicators of such 
actions. Patterns and indicators are obvious in both Estonia and Ukraine. One can see 
Russian engagements especially within organizations on a sub-state actor level. It 
identifies Russian governmental organizations working through proxy organizations, 
such as nongovernmental organizations. Furthermore, the research emphasizes the 
importance of cooperation between agencies and NGOs not only to better resist attempts 
of subversion but also to detect them earlier. The solution seems to be close cooperation 
between NGOs and their governmental counterparts and strong alliances. It seems to be 
even more important for small state actors because they lack the deterrence aura that 
follows a larger country with bigger armed forces. 
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